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RETHINKING NOVELTY IN PATENT LAW 
SEAN B. SEYMORE† 
ABSTRACT 
  The novelty requirement seeks to ensure that a patent will not issue 
if the public already possesses the invention. Although gauging 
possession is usually straightforward for simple inventions, it can be 
difficult for those in complex fields like biotechnology, chemistry, and 
pharmaceuticals. For example, if a drug company seeks to patent a 
promising molecule that was disclosed but never physically made in 
the prior art, the key possession question is whether a person having 
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) could have made it at the time of 
the prior disclosure. Put differently, could the PHOSITA rely on 
then-existing knowledge in the field to fill in any missing technical 
details from the prior disclosure? This Article argues that existing 
novelty jurisprudence mishandles the possession question in two 
ways. First, it tends to overestimate the PHOSITA’s then-existing 
knowledge by failing to fully appreciate the complex nature of certain 
technologies. Second, the current examination framework vitiates the 
presumption of novelty by placing proof burdens on the would-be 
inventor that can thwart innovation and frustrate important objectives 
of the patent system. To resolve these problems and to fill a gap in 
patent scholarship, this Article proposes a new paradigm that 
reframes the novelty inquiry during patent examination. Its 
implementation will not only improve the quality of issued patents, 
but also make the patent literature a more robust source of technical 
information. This Article contributes to broader policy debates over 
patent reform and joins a larger effort to bridge the disconnect 
between patent law and the norms of science. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. patent system is a pendulum. It swings back and forth, 
attempting to balance the need to reward inventors for their work 
against the need to foster innovation through the dissemination of 
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technical knowledge.1 When the pendulum swings too far in one 
direction, the courts,2 Congress,3 and even the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (Patent Office)4 seek to make adjustments through 
patent reform. Perhaps due to criticisms that the system has become 
too “pro-patent,”5 reform efforts in recent years have led to the 
scaling back of patent rights.6 Some of these reforms have tightened 
the standards for patentability.7 Indeed, patentability has become a 
 
 1. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that the 
information disclosed in the patent adds to the public storehouse of knowledge); Brenner v. 
Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (“It is true, of course, that one of the purposes of the patent 
system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.”); 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (describing a patent as “a reward, an 
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829) 
(recognizing that the patent system seeks to promote the progress of the useful arts and to 
reward inventors); Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1518) 
(“Patents for inventions are . . . a just reward [for ingenuity], and . . . highly beneficial to the 
public, not only by holding out suitable encouragements to genius and talents and enterprise; 
but as ultimately securing to the whole community great advantages from the free 
communication of [knowledge], which may be most important to all the great interests of 
society . . . .”). 
 2. See infra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 3. E.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (as introduced by Rep. 
Conyers, Mar. 3, 2009), 155 CONG. REC. H2923 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 
2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy, Mar. 3, 2009), 155 CONG. REC. 
S2691, S2706–16 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007), 153 CONG. REC. H10,307 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007); 
Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy, Apr. 18, 
2007), 153 CONG. REC. S4675, S4685–92 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007). 
 4. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2010–2015 STRATEGIC PLAN 10–25 
(2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO_2010-2015_Strategic_Plan.pdf 
(describing several initiatives that will improve examination timelines and patent quality); Press 
Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Will Begin Study of Patent Examiners’ 
Production Goals (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2007/07-42.jsp 
(predicting that the study will lead to changes in the Patent Office that will “motivate 
employees, improve [the] work environment, and enhance the quality and efficiency of the 
patent examination process”). 
 5. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 98–107 
(2004) (exploring trends in the Federal Circuit toward strengthening patentees’ rights); William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
111, 128 (2004) (concluding that the “pro-patent leanings” of the Federal Circuit have “had a 
significant effect on patent activity”). 
 6. See infra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 7. The conditions for patentability are found in Title 35 of the United States Code. In 
short, the claimed invention must be useful, novel, nonobvious, and directed to patentable 
subject matter. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006). In addition, § 112, ¶ 1, requires that the application 
adequately describe, enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying out the invention; and 
§ 112, ¶ 2, requires that the application conclude with claims that delineate the invention with 
particularity. 
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hot topic as reform-minded courts, in a series of landmark decisions, 
have relied on narrowing it to trim the scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter8 and to make patents harder to obtain (and easier to 
invalidate) based on obviousness.9 
These reform efforts have rekindled broader discussions about 
other patentability requirements. One that has received relatively 
little attention in recent commentary is novelty, which is the statutory 
requirement that an invention be new.10 Determining novelty requires 
a comparison of the invention that the applicant seeks to patent with 
the “prior art,” which refers to preexisting knowledge and technology 
already available to the public.11 Documents like issued patents and 
printed publications are common sources of prior art.12 A document 
asserted against the invention that the applicant seeks to patent is 
called a prior art reference.13 
To qualify as novelty-defeating prior art, the reference must 
satisfy three conditions.14 First, it must predate the applicant’s 
invention or have existed more than one year before the applicant’s 
filing date.15 Second, every element of the claimed invention16 must be 
identically disclosed or described within the four corners of the prior 
 
 8. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that claims relating to a 
method of hedging risks are unpatentable). 
 9. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s 
rigid test for nonobviousness due to its inconsistency with the “expansive and flexible” approach 
set forth in Supreme Court precedent). 
 10. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 11. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
 12. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (defining the documents and activities that can serve as prior art). 
 13. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (3d ed. 2001). 
 14. Prior art is also used to determine whether an invention is obvious. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a) (providing that an invention is not patentable “if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would 
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art to which said subject matter pertains”). For a discussion of obviousness and its relationship 
to novelty, see infra notes 104 and 170. 
 15. Prior art provisions fall into two main categories: (1) the novelty provisions of 
§§ 102(a), (e), and (g), which depend on the invention date; and (2) the loss-of-right provisions 
of § 102(b), which depend on the applicant’s filing date. See 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER 
ON PATENTS § 8:1 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining § 102 of the Patent Act). 
 16. A patent claim must define “the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim element further limits the breadth of the claim. 1 
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, at Gl-3 (2009). For an illustration, see infra note 19 
and accompanying text. 
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art reference.17 This is referred to as the “strict identity” 
requirement.18 So, for example, if an applicant seeks to claim a paper 
clip made with titanium and nickel, the reference must also disclose a 
paper clip made with titanium and nickel.19 Third, the reference must 
be enabling.20 This means that the reference must disclose the subject 
matter in sufficient detail to enable a person having ordinary skill in 
the art (PHOSITA)21 to make it without undue experimentation.22 If a 
reference meets all three criteria, it “anticipates” the claim23 and 
 
 17. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 
868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The identical invention must be shown in as complete 
detail as is contained in the patent claim.”); see also Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park 
Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that another reference or knowledge 
in the art cannot supply missing elements). 
 18. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting 
the “strict identity” test for novelty); see also Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 
F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that “a prior art disclosure which is only 
‘substantially the same’ as the claimed invention” is insufficient to defeat novelty). 
 19. In this hypothetical, titanium and nickel are claim elements. See supra note 16. 
 20. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In 
order to anticipate, a prior art reference must not only disclose all of the limitations of the 
claimed invention, but also be enabled.”); Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & 
Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To serve as an anticipating reference, the 
reference must enable that which it is asserted to anticipate.”). 
 21. The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably prudent 
person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that a PHOSITA is “not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”). 
Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include “(1) the 
educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art 
solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of 
the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. 
Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 22. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For a 
discussion of what constitutes undue experimentation, see infra Part I.B.2. 
 23. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“Anticipation requires the disclosure in a single prior art reference of each element of the 
claim under consideration.”); see also Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 
631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the 
claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). “In 
deciding the issue of anticipation, the trier of fact must identify the elements of the claims, 
determine their meaning . . . , and identify corresponding elements disclosed in the allegedly 
anticipating reference.” Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 
F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 771 
(Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled by SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (en banc); SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 377 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)). 
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renders it unpatentable (or invalid) for lack of novelty24 because the 
subject matter is considered to be in the public’s possession.25 
Although the foregoing analysis tends to be simple for paper 
clips, it can be difficult for more-complex subject matter. For 
example, consider an inventor at a drug company who seeks to obtain 
a patent on a promising compound, X. At the time of filing, X is, as 
far as the inventor knows, previously unknown. Yet, during patent 
examination, the examiner uncovers a third-party patent26 that 
discloses, but does not claim, X and makes a few speculative 
statements about how compounds like X might be made.27 Is this 
modicum of disclosure sufficiently enabling to anticipate? If it offers 
no more than a starting point for further experimentation, the answer 
 
 24. Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int’l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also 1 
CHISUM, supra note 16, at G1-14 (defining novelty as a basic patentability requirement that 
“precludes any claim that is anticipated by any single reference in the prior art”). Though 
§ 102(b) is technically not a novelty provision, “[i]t is clearly established that novelty is 
lacking . . . when the [§ 102(b)] prior art product or process is identical to that of the inventor’s 
product or process.” 2 CHISUM, supra note 16, § 6.02[3]. 
 25. Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As a 
general matter, patent applicants aggressively seek to limit the universe of prior art that can be 
asserted against them during examination. The easiest way to accomplish this is to show that a 
particular reference cannot serve as prior art because of its publication date. For example, an 
applicant facing a lack-of-novelty rejection based on a journal article published the day after the 
applicant’s filing date can simply identify the date discrepancy and compel the Patent Office to 
remove the reference and withdraw the rejection. This is true even if the reference discloses an 
identical paper clip made with titanium and nickel. The analysis is simple and objective because 
§ 102 determines when references become available as prior art. Nonetheless, applicants have 
an incentive to ensure that the examiner considers all potentially patent-defeating prior art. See 
Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that an accused infringer 
may invalidate a patent more easily if the examiner never considered the asserted prior art). 
 26. It is often forgotten that the patent document serves several key roles in the patent 
system. Most prominently, the claims establish the boundaries of the patentee’s right to exclude, 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006), which expires twenty years from the earliest effective filing date, id. 
§ 154(a)(2). But in addition, the disclosure (the written description and the drawings) of a 
patent or published patent application can serve as prior art. Id. § 102(a), (b), (e). A patent is 
effective as prior art as of its filing date and remains so forever (just like a book, a magazine, or 
any other printed publication). See id. § 102(e)(2) (providing that an invention is not patentable 
if it is described in “a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United 
States before the invention by the applicant for patent”); In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1385 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that § 102(e) “codified the history of treating the disclosure of a 
U.S. patent as prior art as of the filing date of the earliest U.S. application to which the patent is 
entitled” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 27. For a discussion of why patentees might disclose subject matter but not claim it, see 
infra notes 124–29, 230–35 and accompanying text. 
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should be no.28 Regardless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (Federal Circuit) has held that, for the sake of expediency, the 
examiner is allowed to presume that the third-party patent is 
enabling.29 In practical terms, this means that the subsequent inventor 
bears the affirmative burden of proving that the third-party patent is 
not enabling.30 
This paradigm raises significant issues, some of which have 
received little attention in patent scholarship.31 First, as a substantive 
matter, in certain fields a PHOSITA needs actual experimental 
details to make the invention without undue experimentation.32 
Second, placing the burden on the inventor to prove that a prior art 
reference is nonenabling vitiates the presumption of patentability that 
applicants should enjoy during examination.33 Third, given these first 
two points, it is not uncommon for patentees “to pad the patent 
 
 28. In the words of Judge Learned Hand, 
If the earlier disclosure offers no more than a starting point for further experiments, if 
its teaching will sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, if it does not inform the 
[PHOSITA how to make] the new invention, it has not correspondingly enriched the 
store of common knowledge, and it is not an anticipation. 
Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942). 
 29. See infra Part II.A. Documentary sources that may serve as prior art include patents 
and scientific journal articles. See supra text accompanying note 11. Regarding the latter 
category, the Federal Circuit has not decided whether nonpatent references are entitled to a 
presumption of enablement. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 
1355 n.22 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We note that by logical extension, our reasoning here might also 
apply to [nonpatent] prior art printed publications as well, but as Sugimoto is a patent we need 
not and do not so decide today.” (emphasis added)). 
 30. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 31. Scholarship that addresses enablement in the prior art context is limited. See, e.g., 
Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness: An Eternal Golden Braid, 15 
AIPLA Q.J. 57, 63 (1987) (“A reference that was not enabling upon its publication can become 
enabling and therefore an anticipation at a later time when additional prior art becomes 
available—showing, for example, a method of making the disclosed invention.”); Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 171–73 (2006) (arguing that the 
Federal Circuit’s “motivation to combine” doctrine incorporates an enablement standard into 
the obviousness determination); Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s 
Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1131–54 (2008) (arguing that courts 
should apply a heightened enablement standard when making inherent anticipation 
determinations); Alan W. White, The Novelty-Destroying Disclosure: Some Recent Decisions, 12 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 315, 316–19 (1990) (exploring British cases that address enablement 
based on prior disclosures). 
 32. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 33. See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
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literature with chaff, presumably to muddy the waters in a defensive 
or nuisance maneuver” to thwart subsequent, deserving inventors.34 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the current paradigm has 
a potential negative effect on innovation. Suppose X in the previous 
example is a drug molecule. In their recent comprehensive study of 
the U.S. patent system, Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer 
show empirically that over two-thirds of the value of worldwide 
patents accrues to chemical and pharmaceutical firms, and that more 
than half accrues to a small number of large pharmaceutical firms.35 
They conclude that chemical and pharmaceutical patents are 
“substantially more valuable than other patents overall.”36 Why is this 
so? First, given that the claims often depict discrete molecular 
structures, the boundaries are clearly defined and thus easier to 
police.37 Second, these patents tend to be broad in scope.38 Third and 
 
 34. David S. Wainwright, Patenting Around Nuisance Prior Art, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 221, 221–22 (1999). For a further discussion of the tactic of disclosing subject matter 
to deliberately thwart a subsequent inventor’s claim, see infra notes 124–29. 
 35. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 109 (2008). The researchers define 
“value” as the private value of the relevant patent, which derives from the right to exclude. Id. 
at 97. This value “is measured relative to the alternative means an innovator has for profiting 
from her invention,” including trade secrecy and profits on complementary goods. Id. at 98. 
Unlike most other industries, the pharmaceutical industry views patents as the most effective 
means of profiting from inventions. See OLIVER GASSMANN, GERRIT REEPMEYER & 
MAXIMILIAN VON ZEDTWITZ, LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: TRENDS AND 
DRIVERS FOR GROWTH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 133–34 (2d ed. 2008) (“[Patent] 
protection is crucial in the pharmaceutical industry as otherwise nobody would invest in 
expensive and long-term drug development.”); see also Edwin Mansfield, Patents and 
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 175 tbl.1 (1986) (reporting that 65 percent 
of products from the pharmaceutical industry would not have been brought to market without 
patent protection, which contrasts with considerably lower numbers for products from other 
industries). Indeed, “it is well known that pharmaceutical companies generally refuse to develop 
new drugs unless they have strong patent protection over them.” Benjamin N. Roin, 
Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 513 (2009). 
 36. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at 107. The payoff is important because 
pharmaceutical companies need to recoup their research and development investments. See 
Roin, supra note 35, at 510 & n.21 (collecting sources which estimate that pharmaceutical 
companies spend an average of at least $800 million to bring a new drug to market). 
 37. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1251, 1279 (2004) (observing that it is easier to detect and show infringement in discrete 
technologies); Richard C. Levin, Alin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 798 (arguing that patents are particularly effective in the 
chemical arts because relatively clear standards can be applied to assess validity and to defend 
against infringement); see also Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing 
Firms Patent (or Not) 18–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), 
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relatedly, it is often difficult for competitors to “invent around” the 
compound of interest.39 These qualities can converge to produce a so-
called blockbuster drug patent.40 A single compound (X) can thus 
generate billions of dollars in annual revenue.41 And perhaps not 
 
available at http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/smartin/courses/590/NBER7552.pdf 
(exploring cross-industry differences in patenting). 
 38. In preparing the claims, a savvy drafter often includes a broad claim encompassing a 
large number—frequently millions—of individual compounds, which serves as a “net” to 
ensnare everything using the basic concept of the patentee. See HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT 
LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTICALS § 87, at 114 (2d ed. 1994) 
(“Claims of varying scope should be provided to take advantage of the multiple claim system. A 
broad ‘claim 1’ is fine as a net to try to capture everyone using the basic concept of the 
patentee.” (citation omitted)). For an extreme example, see U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed 
June 21, 1991). This particular patent includes a structural formula in claim 1 that encompasses 
at least one novemdecillion (1060, or one followed by sixty zeroes) chemical compounds. Id. cols. 
133–34. Given that a pharmaceutical patent application is often filed at an early stage of 
research and development when end results or uses remain uncertain, the resulting patent is like 
an expensive lottery ticket with the hoped-for payoff being the substantial revenue generated by 
at least one claimed molecule. Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using 
Statistical Survival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 328 n.30 (2002) 
(using a lottery analogy); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1521, 1548 (2005) (same). 
 39. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1616–17 (2003) (explaining that pharmaceutical patents must be broad enough to prevent 
invent-arounds). In addition to the possibility of infringement, the unpredictable nature of 
chemistry hinders the development of successful invent-arounds because “even a minute change 
to a chemical molecule results in an entirely non-substitutable product.” Barnett, supra note 37, 
at 1279. 
 40. The pharmaceutical industry defines a blockbuster drug as one that generates at least 
$1 billion in annual revenue. RONALD J. VOGEL, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 25 (2007). This payoff is important because pharmaceutical companies need to recoup 
their research and development investments. See Roin, supra note 35, at 510 & n.21 (collecting 
sources that estimate that pharmaceutical companies spend an average of at least $800 million 
to bring a new drug to market). 
 41. Many pharmaceutical companies rely on a few blockbuster drugs to recoup their 
investment in innovation and to cover the costs of failed products. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY ch. 3, at 5 (2003); see also Roin, supra note 35, at 510 & n.21 (“Pharmaceutical 
companies on average spend upwards of $800 million on R&D for each new drug that reaches 
the market.”). A pharmaceutical company may screen hundreds of thousands of chemical 
compounds as likely candidates for development, but for “every 10,000 compounds that are 
evaluated in animal studies, 10 will make it to human clinical trials in order to get 1 compound 
on the market.” RICHARD B. SILVERMAN, THE ORGANIC CHEMISTRY OF DRUG DESIGN AND 
DRUG ACTION 8 (2d ed. 2004). In addition, bringing a new drug to market can take twelve to 
fifteen years and can cost over $800 million. Id.; see also Christopher P. Adams & Van V. 
Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH 
AFF. 420, 424 (2006) (estimating a total cost of $868 million per approved drug); Joseph A. 
DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (estimating the total research 
and development cost per drug as $802 million). To appreciate the amount of revenue that a 
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surprisingly, the blockbuster drug usually spawns significant research 
activity aiming to produce competitive or follow-on products.42 The 
ability to derive these rewards from X, however, is jeopardized if the 
compound is deemed unpatentable because of a prior disclosure of its 
name or structure. Denying a patent to someone who can actually 
enable X can frustrate both the economic and innovation-related 
goals of the patent system.43 
This Article attempts to address these issues and explore a new 
analytical framework for gauging novelty for complex inventions. For 
concreteness, the Article focuses on the common scenario described 
in the foregoing discussion: when a third party’s patent is asserted as 
novelty-defeating prior art against a would-be inventor.44 This Article 
 
blockbuster drug can generate, consider the cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor—the best-selling 
drug of all time—which generated over $13.6 billion in revenue for Pfizer in 2006. See 
GASSMANN ET AL., supra note 35, at 7 tbl.2 (analyzing blockbuster drug data); see also Matthew 
Herper & Peter Kang, The World’s Ten Best-Selling Drugs, FORBES.COM (Mar. 27, 2006, 6:00 
AM ET), http://www.forbes.com/2006/03/21/pfizer-merck-amgen-cx_mh_pk_0321topdrugs.html 
(revealing that Lipitor’s annual sales are more than twice as high as its closest competitor). The 
Lipitor patent expires in June 2011. See U.S. Patent No. RE40,667 (filed Jan. 16, 2007) (reissue 
patent); U.S. Patent No. 5,273,995 (filed Feb. 26, 1991) (original patent); see also Susan Decker, 
Pfizer Wins New Lipitor Patent Expiring in June 2011 (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6, 2009, 
4:46 PM EST), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aNSygEPe7QWw&pid=newsarchive 
(discussing the reissue of Pfizer’s patent on Lipitor’s key ingredient after the company modified 
“inconsistent language” that an appellate court had found rendered the patent invalid). 
 42. See STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 51 (2d ed. 
2007) (“[Biotechnology firms that] are able to generate revenue . . . typically reinvest in their 
products (and in follow-on products in the pipeline) in hopes of discovering yet another new 
drug, perhaps a spin-off of the earlier one.”). 
 43. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 44. See supra text accompanying notes 26–30. This is a common scenario because 
examiners in the Patent Office are familiar with patents and have easy access to them. Thus, 
most prior art rejections are likely to involve patent documents. See John R. Allison & Mark A. 
Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 101–02 
(2002) (presenting empirical findings on references to prior art); see also John R. Allison & 
Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2120 (2000) (“The predominance of U.S. patents [as cited prior art] 
may . . . reflect the limitations of the [Patent Office] systems for searching: the [Patent Office] is 
much more likely to find documents that it itself has generated.”). This Article does not explore 
scenarios in which the inventor’s own prior activities or disclosure can serve as novelty-
defeating prior art, although such scenarios can be problematic, particularly in the academic and 
drug-discovery contexts. See Roin, supra note 35, at 527–31 (discussing the difficulty of 
satisfying the novelty requirement in university and drug-development contexts because of the 
possibility of premature disclosure); Sean B. Seymore, The “Printed Publication” Bar After 
Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About Science?, 
40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 495 (2007) (“Klopfenstein is particularly important in the realm of 
academic science because it suggests that under certain circumstances a run-of-the-mill research 
talk can become a § 102(b) ‘printed publication’ and trigger the one-year clock.”). 
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fills a gap in patent scholarship and contributes to broader policy 
debates over patent reform. It is part of a larger project to bridge the 
disconnect between patent law and the norms of science.45 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the basic novelty 
question, which is whether the public already possesses the invention. 
It explores the technical difficulties that arise in answering this 
question for inventions in unpredictable fields like chemistry, 
biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals.46 After briefly describing the 
current examination framework, Part II turns to what is perhaps the 
most important unresolved issue in the law of anticipation: whether 
and under what circumstances the appearance of a chemical name or 
structure in the prior art anticipates a subsequent inventor’s claim for 
the compound. Although the Patent Office and the courts have 
wrestled with the “quintessential novelty problem” since the earliest 
days of the chemical era, this Part contends that current anticipation 
doctrines and vestiges of older ones often produce paradoxical 
 
 45. See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 127 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement] (proposing a new 
approach for examining patent applications in unpredictable technologies which, by requiring 
applicants to disclose actual experimental results, resolves a striking incongruity between patent 
law and the experimental sciences); Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009) 
[hereinafter Seymore, Serendipity] (arguing that although accidental discoveries pervade 
science, inventors who invent by accident can be unjustly deprived of patents because such 
discoveries do not mesh with the substantive law of invention); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching 
Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching 
Function] (proposing a disclosure regime that would allow patents to compete with other forms 
of technical literature as a source of substantive technical information). 
 46. The courts refer to chemistry, biotechnology, and related experimental fields as 
“unpredictable” because skilled artisans in these fields often cannot predict whether a reaction 
protocol that works for one embodiment will work for others. Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, 
Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (explaining that in the 
chemical arts, “a slight variation . . . can yield an unpredictable result or may not work at all”). 
On the other hand, applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering are often 
regarded as “predictable” arts because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. In re 
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But enablement depends on the facts in a given case 
because, for example, a mechanical device can have unpredictable features. See In re Bowen, 
492 F.2d 859, 861–62 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (criticizing the dichotomy and advocating an alternative 
classification). For a deeper exploration of the predictable/unpredictable dichotomy, see 
Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 45, at 136–39; and Sean B. Seymore, The 
Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 282–84 (2008). The 
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) was a predecessor to the Federal Circuit. 
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the Federal Circuit adopted the C.C.P.A. 
decisional law as binding precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
1982) (en banc). 
SEYMORE IN FINAL.DOC 12/29/2010  5:30:42 PM 
930 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:919 
outcomes seemingly incongruous with basic principles of patent law. 
To that end, Part III offers a new patent examination framework that 
reframes the novelty inquiry. By eliminating presumptions and 
shifting burdens of proof, the new paradigm will at last resolve the 
quintessential novelty problem, foster innovation, and promote other 
goals of patent policy. Finally, in response to some of the concerns 
that accompany the new paradigm, this Part explores how it will 
improve the quality of both issued patents and the patent literature. 
I.  NOVELTY AND POSSESSION 
A. Does the Invention Already Belong to the Public? 
A bedrock principle of patent law is that a patent cannot issue if 
it would remove technology that is already in the public domain.47 The 
corollary is that inventions “must be new, that is, bestowed for the 
first time upon the public by the patentee.”48 As nineteenth-century 
legal historian George Ticknor Curtis wrote in his famous treatise on 
patent law, when the invention has already been described in the 
prior art, 
the public have acquired nothing from the [disclosure] of the 
patentee[] which they did not possess before, and . . . the patentee 
has invented nothing, which he, as one of the public, could not have 
derived from the means of knowledge which the public before 
possessed. Hence it is, that the production of a prior description, 
which was in the possession of the public, negatives the title of the 
patentee as the first inventor.49 
 
 47. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989) (noting 
that Thomas Jefferson, the “driving force behind early federal patent policy,” believed that “a 
grant of patent rights in an idea already disclosed to the public [i]s akin to an ex post facto law, 
‘obstruct[ing] others in the use of what they possessed before’” (quoting Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
326, 327 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903))); Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (explaining that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to authorize 
the issuance of patents that would remove existing knowledge from the public domain); Max 
Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA. 
L. REV. 229, 236–42 (1999) (exploring the constitutional basis and statutory background for 
prohibiting the granting of patents that would remove technology from the public domain). 
 48. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 305 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890). 
 49. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 292 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1854) (footnote 
omitted); cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent 
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To allow otherwise would not only add nothing to the sum of human 
knowledge,50 but “would in fact injure the public by removing existing 
knowledge from public use.”51 Thus, novelty serves to safeguard the 
public’s right to enjoy what it already possesses.52 
B. The Enablement Question 
Anticipation requires, first, strict identity between the previously 
disclosed and the now-claimed subject matter;53 and, second, an 
enabling disclosure.54 Although checking for strict identity is often 
 
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2000) (“Granting patents on technologies that are not 
new would impose the social costs of monopolies without the countervailing benefits of 
promoting development and introduction of welfare-enhancing inventions.”). 
 50. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (“An inventor 
deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of 
value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.”); see also 1 ROBINSON, 
supra note 48, at 305 (“If the same [knowledge] has been already made accessible to [the public] 
by the inventive genius . . . no benefit results to them from his inventive act and there is no 
consideration for his patent.”). 
 51. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148. Therefore, the logic behind the novelty requirement “is 
fairly straightforward . . . . [because if] information is already in the public domain when the 
‘inventor’ seeks to patent it[,] society has no need to grant a patent to get this information.” 
Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 12–13 
(1992). 
 52. As the late Judge Giles S. Rich once wrote about knowledge already present in the 
public domain, “Society, speaking through Congress and the courts, has said ‘thou shalt not take 
it away.’” Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 53. Anticipation occurs if the prior art discloses what the applicant seeks to claim. See 
supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 54. In other words, the prior art reference must disclose the subject matter in sufficient 
detail to enable a PHOSITA to make it without undue experimentation. See supra notes 20–25 
and accompanying text. The requirement that an anticipatory reference contain an enabling 
disclosure can be traced back to Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516 (1870). In that case, 
an accused infringer attempted to use a foreign publication to invalidate the patent-at-issue. Id. 
at 554. Finding the publication’s disclosure inadequate, the Supreme Court stated, 
Patented inventions cannot be superseded by the mere introduction of [the 
reference], though of prior date, unless the description . . . contain[s] . . . a substantial 
representation of the patented improvement, in such full, clear, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, to make, 
construct, and practice the invention to the same practical extent as they would be 
enabled to do if the information was derived from a prior patent. Mere vague and 
general representations will not support such a defence . . . . 
Id. at 555; cf. Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, 370 (1876) (“It must be admitted that, unless 
the earlier [reference] does exhibit the later patented invention in such a full and intelligible 
manner as to enable persons skilled in the art to which the invention is related to comprehend it 
without assistance from the patent, or to make it, or repeat the process claimed, it is insufficient 
to invalidate the patent.”). In support of its holding, the Seymour Court cited the Curtis treatise, 
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 555 n.*, which states that 
the description [in the allegedly anticipatory reference] must be such as to give the 
public the means of knowledge, or, in other words, must of itself enable the public to 
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quite easy, gauging enablement is not. This last point is particularly 
important because the question of whether the public already 
possesses the claimed subject matter often reduces to a question of 
enablement.55 
1. Defining the Standard.  Enablement questions typically arise in 
two contexts in patent law. Section 112, ¶ 1, of the Patent Act56 
compels a patent applicant to submit a written description57 that 
enables a PHOSITA to make and use the full scope of the claimed 
invention without undue experimentation.58 This “statutory” or 
patent-supporting form of enablement places an outer limit on the 
scope of the claims.59 By contrast, the form pertaining to prior art 
references discussed earlier is referred to as “anticipatory” or patent-
defeating enablement, because it is used to demonstrate that a 
PHOSITA could use preexisting knowledge to make the invention.60 
 
practise the invention. It is not necessary that the invention should have been reduced 
to practice, but, unless the description would enable the public, without further 
invention, to put the thing in practice, it cannot be said that a knowledge of that thing 
is in the possession of the public. 
CURTIS, supra note 49, § 292 (emphases added). 
 55. See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“Enablement looks to placing the subject matter of the claims generally in the possession of the 
public.”). 
 56. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 57. The written description is the part of the patent (or patent application) in which the 
patentee discloses the invention. See supra note 26. 
 58. The statutory disclosure requirement has four parts, which appear in the first and 
second paragraphs of § 112: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1–2 (emphases added). Although the term “undue experimentation” does 
not appear in the statute, “it is well established that enablement requires that the [written 
description] teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue 
experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 59. The scope of the claims must “be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement.” 
Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). The scope of enablement “is that which is disclosed in the [written description] plus the 
scope of what would be known to [a PHOSITA] without undue experimentation.” Id. 
 60. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 16, § 3.04; F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F. 
SCHWARTZ & HENRY E. SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 413 (4th ed. 2008). 
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Although similar to its statutory cousin, anticipatory enablement 
is a narrower doctrine.61 A prior art reference need not demonstrate 
utility in order to anticipate.62 And an anticipatory reference need 
only enable what falls precisely within the scope of the claim-at-issue 
and nothing more.63 By comparison, an enabling description for 
patent-supporting purposes must enable the full scope of the claimed 
subject matter.64 These differing standards reveal a curious 
asymmetry: a description that is sufficient to anticipate a claim for 
patent-defeating purposes might be insufficient to enable a claim for 
patent-supporting purposes.65 
2. Technical Difficulties.  Although the patent statute does not 
distinguish between different fields of invention in setting and 
applying legal standards,66 technology matters in patent law, 
particularly in the enablement context. Determining whether undue 
 
 61. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“The standard for what constitutes proper enablement of a prior art reference for purposes of 
anticipation under section 102 . . . differs from the enablement standard under section 112.” 
(quoting Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). 
“Enablement” does not appear anywhere within the text of § 102. Thus, the doctrine is the 
result of a “judicially imposed limitation” on § 102 that the description of the subject matter in 
the reference must be an enabling description. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962); 
see also Mueller & Chisum, supra note 31, at 1137–38 (comparing the two forms of enablement). 
 62. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Rasmusson, 413 F.3d at 1326). 
In an earlier case, Judge Rich provided a statutory basis for the distinction, noting that § 112 
provides that the written description “must enable [the PHOSITA] to ‘use’ the invention 
whereas § 102 makes no such requirement as to an anticipatory disclosure.” In re Hafner, 410 
F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Thus, the “double standard” is “implicitly[,] if not explicitly, 
required by law.” Id. 
 63. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 64. See infra note 219. 
 65. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (recognizing the 
distinction); In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (same). 
 66. The patent statute is essentially technology-neutral on its face, although several 
commentators argue that it is technology-specific in application. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 59–65 (2009) (describing 
how the courts treat industries differently); Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1654 (same); 
William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to This Judicial 
Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 323–28 (2007) (same). Congress added a technology-specific 
provision to the nonobviousness section of the statute in 1995. Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 351, 351 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006)) (addressing 
biotechnology patent processes). Interestingly, technological distinctions are prohibited by the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which states that 
patent rights shall be “enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.” 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 27.1, 108 
Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
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experimentation is required to make what is disclosed in the prior art, 
and thus whether the reference is enabling, is a fact-intensive 
inquiry.67 The discussion in this Section explores the key, interrelated 
technical issues: (1) whether the alleged prior art reference includes 
working examples of the invention or merely describes it, (2) the 
PHOSITA’s knowledge at the time of publication, and (3) the nature 
of the technology. 
It stands to reason that the enablement analysis should be 
straightforward if the prior art reference discloses working examples. 
Yet it is more likely that the third-party patentee never physically 
made the subject matter in question (X).68 The Federal Circuit has 
held that an anticipatory reference need not include actual 
experimental results.69 This is because the teachings of the reference 
must be considered together with the knowledge in the art.70 The 
court has often explained that a reference “need not . . . explain every 
 
 67. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 45, at 147–50 (describing what 
constitutes undue experimentation). Relevant considerations include the nature of the 
invention, the breadth of the claims, the level of predictability of the art, the quantity of 
experimentation necessary, the presence or absence of working examples, the amount of 
direction presented, the prior art, and the relative skill of those in the art. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 
731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (explaining that the Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory). For cases 
applying the Wands factors in the anticipatory-enablement context, see Impax Labs., Inc. v. 
Aventis Pharm. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 68. For instance, consider again U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed June 21, 1991). See supra 
note 38. While the patent discloses at least one novemdecillion (1060, or one followed by sixty 
zeroes) chemical compounds, the patentee only provided working examples for thirty-nine of 
them. ’351 Patent cols. 7–133. 
 69. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(finding secret tests conducted before the critical date to be irrelevant); see also In re Donohue, 
766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (sustaining an anticipation rejection for a primary reference 
disclosing a compound and other references disclosing sufficient information to make that 
compound). This accords with the lack of express requirement in the Patent Act that an 
applicant physically reduce an invention to practice before obtaining a patent. See Pfaff v. Wells 
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1998) (interpreting the statute). 
 70. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[A] prior art reference must be 
‘considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.’” (quoting 
In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (C.C.P.A. 1978))); see also In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 
(C.C.P.A. 1962) (explaining that the proper test is whether the PHOSITA “could take the 
description of the invention in the printed publication and combine it with his own knowledge 
of the particular art and from this combination be put in possession of the invention on which a 
patent is sought”). 
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detail” because the PHOSITA can rely on this knowledge in the art 
to fill in the gaps omitted from the disclosure.71 
But gap filling raises several concerns. First, PHOSITAs can 
more easily fill gaps in certain fields than in others. A chemist usually 
cannot extrapolate from the result of one chemical reaction to predict 
how another chemical will react with any reasonable expectation of 
success because of the unpredictable nature of the art.72 On the other 
hand, inventions in applied technologies like paper-clip making and 
rock crushing are often regarded as predictable because they are 
rooted in well-defined, calculable factors.73 The PHOSITA has an 
easier time filling gaps in this latter category.74 
Second, courts allow the decisionmaker to use additional 
references to elucidate the PHOSITA’s knowledge at the time of the 
asserted prior art reference.75 At first glance, this recourse to extrinsic 
evidence seems to violate the “four corners” rule of anticipation 
doctrine, which requires that each and every element of the claimed 
invention be found in a single prior art document.76 The Federal 
 
 71. Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480 (quoting DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
1985)). 
 72. In the unpredictable arts, a PHOSITA typically must engage in trial and error to figure 
out what works and what does not. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 66, at 115 (explaining that 
if the art is uncertain, “the court will be inclined to require greater disclosure to satisfy the 
requirements of section 112, and correspondingly to narrow the scope of claims permissible 
from any given disclosure”); Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for 
Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455, 458 (1994) (presenting a biotechnology example); 
cases cited supra note 46. “In view of the rapid advances in science,” however, it may be that 
what is “unpredictable at one point in time may become predictable at a later time.” Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This helps explain why 
enablement is a shifting, unstable doctrine. See Holbrook, supra note 31, at 176 (“[E]nablement 
doctrine . . . is far from pristine. It is more of a standard than a rule.”). 
 73. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the requisite level of 
disclosure for an invention involving a “predictable” factor such as a mechanical or electrical 
element is less than that required for the unpredictable arts); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 66, 
at 115 (explaining that less disclosure is required “[i]f the art is predictable and the PHOSITA 
quite skilled”). 
 74. Nonetheless, elucidating the PHOSITA’s knowledge is a fact-specific inquiry. See supra 
note 21. The unpredictable-predictable dichotomy thus is not always dispositive in resolving the 
gap-filling question. See supra note 46. 
 75. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“[A]nticipation requires that the four corners of a single, prior art document describe 
every element of the claimed invention . . . .”); supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. One 
commentator argues that the Federal Circuit’s broadening of the “four corners” definition of 
anticipation has led to conflicts with other patent law doctrines. See Robin Feldman, Rethinking 
Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29–39 (2005). 
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Circuit has in fact emphasized that using the additional reference to 
expand the technical content of the asserted prior art reference 
violates the rule77 and knocks the inquiry out of the novelty realm.78 
But courts have generally held that the rule is not violated when the 
purpose of the additional reference is to educate the decisionmaker in 
one of the following ways: (1) to clarify, interpret, or explain the 
asserted prior art’s teachings;79 or (2) to show that a PHOSITA could 
in fact make a chemical compound (X) even though the asserted prior 
art reference merely discloses the compound’s name or structure.80 
Although drawing a line between permissible and impermissible 
uses of additional references might be easy for simple technologies 
like paper clips, recourse to extrinsic evidence to show enablement 
for chemical compounds always poses a high risk of violating the 
four-corners standard for anticipation.81 
II.  THE NOVELTY PARADOX 
A. Assessing Novelty 
1. The Current Examination Framework.  In determining 
whether chemical compound X is novel, the Patent Office undertakes 
a three-step analysis.82 First, the examiner must construe the relevant 
claim in the patent application to determine its scope.83 In the case of 
 
 77. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (explaining that the role of the additional reference is not “to fill gaps” in the asserted 
prior art document), abrogated on other grounds by Abbott Labs v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 724, 727 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (affirming the district court’s findings on anticipation because the accused infringer 
sought to use the additional references not to interpret or shed light on the prior art reference, 
but to impermissibly supplement its teachings). 
 78. For a discussion of lack of nonobviousness as an alternative basis for unpatentability, 
see infra note 104. 
 79. See Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1576 (“It is sometimes appropriate to consider extrinsic 
evidence to explain the disclosure of a reference.”); see also In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 
F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence may be considered when it is used to 
explain, but not expand, the meaning of a reference.”). 
 80. See infra Part II.B. 
 81. See infra Part II. 
 82. Courts undertake a similar analysis. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 8 F. 
Supp. 2d 434, 443–44 (D.N.J. 1998) (articulating the three steps), aff’d, 192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
 83. See Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he anticipation inquiry first demands a proper claim construction.”). At the prosecution 
stage, the examiner must give claim terms the broadest reasonable interpretation a PHOSITA 
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X, this tends to be straightforward because the claim’s elements can 
be easily deduced from the compound’s structure.84 Second, to check 
for strict identity, the examiner must compare the construed claim 
with the compound recited in the prior art reference to determine if 
each claim element is found in it.85 Third, the examiner must 
determine whether the alleged prior art reference was sufficiently 
enabling to teach a PHOSITA how to make X without undue 
experimentation at that time. If so, X is already in possession of the 
public.86 
If the subject matter disclosed in the reference is identical to that 
which is later claimed by the subsequent inventor,87 the analysis 
essentially reduces to a question of enablement. Whether a prior art 
reference is enabling is a question of law based on underlying factual 
inquiries.88 On appeal, the question of whether a reference is enabling 
is reviewed de novo, and the underlying factual inquiries are reviewed 
deferentially.89 Whether a reference anticipates is a question of fact.90 
The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.)91 
articulated a burden-shifting framework to handle anticipatory-
enablement issues that arise during patent examination.92 As a 
 
would give them while simultaneously conferring an interpretation consistent with the 
applicant’s written description. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 84. See In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (explaining that “every material 
element of the claimed subject matter, the chemical compound, could be found in the primary 
reference, a disclosure of that compound”). For a hypothetical example, consider the following: 
if the inventor seeks to patent Ni(CO)4, and a third-party patent recites Ni(CO)4 by structure or 
chemical name (“nickel tetracarbonyl”), then strict identity is met because the prior art teaches 
each and every element of the subject matter (a nickel atom surrounded by four carbonyl 
groups). 
 85. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (“It is axiomatic that for prior art to anticipate under § 102 it has to meet every element of 
the claimed invention . . . .”). 
 86. Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In 
re Brown, 329 F.2d 1006, 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1964)); see also supra Part I. 
 87. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 88. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 89. For appeals from the Patent Office, the Federal Circuit reviews the factual 
underpinnings for substantial evidence. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
Appellate courts review lower courts’ factual findings in bench trials for clear error. Impax 
Labs., 545 F.3d at 1315. 
 90. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. 
(9 Wall.) 812, 814–15 (1869)). 
 91. The C.C.P.A. was a predecessor to the Federal Circuit. See supra note 46. 
 92. The framework took shape soon after the C.C.P.A.’s adoption of the possession 
standard for anticipatory enablement. See In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681–82 (C.C.P.A. 1980) 
(explaining that anticipatory-enablement issues are governed by a burden-shifting regime); In re 
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starting point, at the time of filing, § 102 affords the applicant a 
presumption of novelty because the statute states that “a person shall 
be entitled to a patent unless” one of the statutory exclusions is 
shown.93 This means that the examiner has the initial burden of 
coming forward with evidence of anticipation.94 The examiner can 
make a prima facie case whenever a reference specifically describes X 
by name or structure.95 If the allegedly anticipatory reference (the 
primary reference) does not describe how to prepare the compound, 
the examiner can rely on one or more secondary references to prove 
that the PHOSITA was capable of making X at the time of the 
primary reference.96 In any event, the examiner can reject the 
applicant’s claim to X for anticipation without conducting an inquiry 
into whether the third-party patent enables the subject matter.97 Put 
simply, the third-party patent enjoys a presumption of enablement.98 
The applicant must rebut this presumption through persuasive 
argument or proof, by a preponderance of the evidence,99 that the 
asserted third-party patent is nonenabling and therefore insufficient 
 
Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450–52 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (outlining the burden-shifting process for the 
anticipatory-enablement inquiry); In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d 743, 745 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (stating that 
the appellants can prevail only if they carry the burden of proof). 
 93. Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Ex parte Thorne, No. 95-4440, 1999 WL 33204520, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 9, 
1999) (reversing the examiner’s rejection under §§ 102 (a) and (b) because the Board was 
“constrained” to do so based on the presumption of novelty); Paul R. Michel, The Challenge 
Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1231, 1249 (1994) (“If the claimed invention is patentable, the applicant is entitled to a 
patent (because [§ 102 of] the statute says so)—not eventually, but as soon as patentability can 
be determined.”). 
 94. Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450; accord In re Sun, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(“The examiner bears the burden of presenting at least a prima facie case of anticipation.”); In 
re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that the Patent Office must establish a 
prima facie case before any burden shifting occurs); see also In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that an examiner must affirmatively prove unpatentability); In re 
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing the examiner’s initial burden of putting 
forth a prima facie case of unpatentability). 
 95. Wilder, 429 F.2d at 451 (noting that a prima facie case is effectively established 
“whenever a reference is shown to contain a disclosure which is specific as to every critical 
element of the appealed claims”). 
 96. See In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–63 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (explaining that although a 
single prior art reference must disclose each and every element of the claimed compound, the 
examiner may rely on additional references to show that a PHOSITA had sufficient knowledge 
to make it); supra text accompanying notes 75–80. 
 97. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (citing In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A 1980)). 
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to have placed X in possession of the public.100 Facts suggesting 
inoperativeness—such as actual experimental data or affidavits from 
experts in the field—are often “highly probative.”101 The examiner 
can then submit evidence to rebut the applicant’s contention of 
nonenablement.102 The burden of production may continue to shift as 
each side presents new evidence;103 however, the examiner carries the 
ultimate burden of persuasion.104 
 
 100. According to the Federal Circuit, 
In response to the [Patent Office]’s asserted prima facie case the applicant may argue 
that the inference of lack of novelty was not properly drawn, for example if the 
[Patent Office] did not correctly apply or understand the subject matter of the 
reference, or if the [Patent Office] drew unwarranted conclusions therefrom. 
However, when the [Patent Office] shows sound basis for believing that the products 
of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of 
showing that they are not. 
In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 101. In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 102. Sasse, 629 F.2d at 681. 
 103. Id. at 681–82. 
 104. In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see also In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring) (articulating the rule that the Patent Office carries 
the burden of persuasion in showing why an applicant should not receive a patent). Absent any 
other grounds of unpatentability, the applicant is entitled to the patent. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This raises an interesting question: if the applicant wins on the 
novelty rejection, can the examiner rely on lack of nonobviousness (§ 103) as an alternative 
basis for unpatentability? Like novelty, nonobviousness is assessed by comparing the claimed 
subject matter to the prior art: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in § 102 . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought 
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would 
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a [PHOSITA] to which said 
subject matter pertains . . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). So in contrast to novelty, which asks whether the invention is new, 
the nonobviousness inquiry seeks to ascertain whether the invention is “new enough” to be 
patented. 2 CHISUM, supra note 16, § 3.01. The facts in In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269 (C.C.P.A. 
1968), illustrate a typical scenario. Upon filing a patent application claiming X, the examiner 
rejected the claim under § 103 based on a reference that disclosed the structurally similar 
compound, X′. Id. at 270–72. Under well-settled law, structurally similar compounds are prima 
facie obvious. In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122, 125–26 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (early recognition); In re Dillon, 
919 F.2d 688, 692–93 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (collecting cases and reaffirming Hass). In 
rebuttal, the applicant (1) proved by affidavit that the cited reference did not teach a PHOSITA 
how to make X and (2) pointed out that the examiner did not cite any secondary references that 
did so. Hoeksema, 399 F.2d at 271–72. The Board nonetheless affirmed the examiner’s rejection, 
contending that a method of making X was only one factor to be considered in the § 103 
analysis. Id. at 273. The C.C.P.A. reversed the Board. In accordance with its post–Von Bramer 
jurisprudence, the C.C.P.A. held that “if the prior art of record fails to disclose or render 
obvious a method for making a claimed compound, at the time the invention was made, it may 
not be legally concluded that the compound itself is in the possession of the public.” Id. at 274. 
But see In re Mahoney, 411 F.2d 1321, 1323–24, 1325 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (affirming a § 103 
rejection because, in contrast to Hoeksema, the examiner proved that there were obvious, 
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The Federal Circuit adopted this burden-shifting framework and 
tweaked it for use in patent litigation.105 In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel, Inc.,106 the court held that the underlying 
presumption of enablement encompasses both claimed and 
unclaimed subject matter in the third-party patent.107 As support for 
its holding, the court explained that the examiner should not bear the 
burden of analyzing enablement each time an allegedly anticipating 
third-party patent is challenged.108 
2. The Proof Paradox.  Although the allocation of burdens and 
presumptions may seem evenhanded and fair, a closer look may paint 
a very different picture. Consider the hypothetical below, which is 
based on a leading case.109 
 
available processes for making the compound at issue). In sum, an examiner cannot rely on 
§ 103 to circumvent the requirement for enabling prior art. As Judge Rich later explained,  
[A] reference which merely describes a thing . . . without telling how to make 
it . . . [will] not support a holding of anticipation unless a [PHOSITA] could take its 
teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in 
possession of [it], or [will] not support a holding of obviousness unless there is some 
known or obvious way to make the thing . . . . 
In re Collins, 462 F.2d 538, 542–43 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 297 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (“The test of whether a particular compound described in the prior art may have 
been relied upon to show that the claimed subject matter at issue would have been obvious is 
whether the prior art provided an enabling disclosure with respect to the disclosed prior art 
compound.”). But the prior art as a whole must be enabling, not just a single reference. 
Holbrook, supra note 31, at 171–73 (citing Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 
892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Even if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is 
prior art for all that it teaches.”)). 
 105. In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the 
Federal Circuit held that when an accused infringer asserts a prior art patent against the 
patentee (as part of an invalidity defense for a lack of novelty), the district court judge may 
presume that the subject matter in that patent is enabled. Id. at 1355. Simply put, the accused 
infringer need not prove enablement. But “[l]ike the applicant in ex parte prosecution, . . . the 
patentee may argue that the relevant claimed or unclaimed disclosures of a prior art patent are 
not enabled and therefore are not pertinent prior art.” Id. If the district court finds the 
patentee’s evidence of nonenablement persuasive, the court “must then exclude that particular 
prior art patent in any anticipation inquiry, for then the presumption has been overcome.” Id.; 
see also Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming 
a district court’s determination that a prior art patent was nonenabling and thus insufficient to 
anticipate the claims of the patent-in-suit). 
 106. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 107. Id. at 1355. The court also made clear that the presumption of enablement is rooted in 
policy and “does not rely on” the statutory presumption of validity afforded to an issued patent 
under 35 U.S.C. § 282. Id. at 1355 n.21. 
 108. Id. 
 109. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
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Suppose that an inventor synthesizes X in 2004 and determines 
that it exhibits anti-inflammatory activity. In light of this utility,110 the 
inventor decides to file a patent application that year, claiming X. The 
examiner rejects the claim as anticipated under § 102(b) by a third-
party patent that issued in 2000 (primary reference), in which X 
appears in a voluminous list of compounds.111 Although X was never 
made, the primary reference states that it can be prepared by treating 
precursor A with B according to the following reaction: 
 
A + B → X 
 
Although B is commercially available from a chemical supplier, 
precursor A is not, and the primary reference is silent about how to 
obtain it. To bolster a prima facie case of anticipation, the examiner 
cites another third-party patent that issued in 1999 (secondary 
reference #1) and that, although not disclosing a method for making 
A, teaches that A is a suitable precursor for producing compounds 
other than X. Yet the examiner reasons that if A appears in both the 
primary reference and secondary reference #1, there must be 
sufficient knowledge in the art for a PHOSITA to make it. 
In response, the applicant submits a sworn declaration to rebut 
the examiner’s prima facie case.112 The declaration states that attempts 
to make A by conventional techniques known in the art have failed. 
Therefore, the applicant argues, if the primary reference’s teachings 
combined with knowledge in the art are nonenabling with respect to 
precursor A, then they must also be nonenabling with respect to X. 
Thus, the applicant contends that the primary reference is insufficient 
for anticipation purposes. 
Impliedly conceding that the applicant rebutted the prima facie 
case, the examiner asserts an additional reference: a pharmacology 
 
 110. Contrary to popular belief, one cannot obtain a patent on a compound simply because 
it is novel. It must also be useful. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a 
patent therefor.”), construed in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (holding that a 
compound that lacks a known use and thus fails to provide a specific benefit to the public is 
unpatentable). Utility is determined as of the applicant’s filing date. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 
1567 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 111. For a discussion of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as a basis for unpatentability, see supra notes 15, 
24 and accompanying text. 
 112. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (2009) (stating that when a claim is rejected, any evidence 
submitted by the applicant to overcome the rejection must be by way of oath or declaration). 
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textbook published in 1983 (secondary reference #2). Although the 
textbook does not specifically mention A, it explains that structurally 
similar compounds were successfully made during the previous 
decade by following a conventional technique with a catalytic amount 
of copper.113 But the textbook also states that success requires careful 
calibration of the reaction conditions, which are quite sensitive to the 
nature of the starting materials. Nonetheless, the examiner contends 
that a PHOSITA has sufficient knowledge and skill to calibrate the 
reaction conditions to make A. 
The applicant’s contention of nonenablement having been 
rebutted, the burden of production shifts back to the applicant. When 
the applicant produces no evidence to challenge the textbook, the 
examiner makes the rejection final.114 The Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences sustains the examiner’s rejection.115 In affirming the 
Board’s decision, the appellate court finds that the applicant’s 
evidence lacks a persuasive factual basis for dismissing the catalytic 
route described in the textbook, specifically noting that the 
applicant’s declaration does not employ any copper catalyst in the 
attempted synthesis of precursor A.116 In the end, the court holds that 
the primary reference, in view of secondary reference #2, contains an 
enabling disclosure that anticipates the applicant’s claim to X.117 
This hypothetical illustrates the evidentiary problems that an 
applicant may face when trying to overcome an allegedly anticipating 
reference. First, even if the applicant successfully rebuts the 
examiner’s initial prima facie case, the examiner can continue to 
assert secondary references to prove that there is sufficient 
knowledge in the art to make X.118 
 
 113. A catalyst is a substance (often a metal) that speeds up a reaction. Catalysts are not 
consumed during the reaction and are often recovered upon its completion. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 90 (James Trefil ed., 2001). 
 114. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.113 (stating that on a second or subsequent examination the rejection 
may be made final). A rejection is not appealable until it has been made final. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 134(a) (2006). 
 115. For a discussion of the Board and its procedures, see infra note 142. 
 116. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681–82 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
 117. Id. at 682. 
 118. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (explaining that the factfinder may look to “any” additional references that establish that 
the allegedly anticipatory reference was enabling to a PHOSITA during the relevant time 
period, including references that postdate the primary reference). 
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Second, attempting to elucidate what the PHOSITA knew at 
some point in the past introduces hindsight problems.119 As Professor 
Gregory Mandel explains, 
[I]ndividuals are not cognitively able to prevent knowledge gained 
through hindsight from impacting their analysis of past events. 
Rather, individuals routinely overestimate the ex ante predictability 
of events after they have occurred. Critical for patent law, once 
individuals have hindsight information, they consistently exaggerate 
what could have been anticipated in foresight and not only tend to 
view what has occurred as having been inevitable, but also as having 
appeared relatively inevitable beforehand.120 
In the enablement context, “[h]indsight bias . . . normally lead[s] 
factfinders to overestimate the level of skill in the art, since 
subsequent advances . . . suggest that the invention could not have 
been that difficult to do.”121 
Third, the hypothetical reveals that in order to overcome the 
rejection, the applicant probably needed experimental proof that the 
 
 119. Though tempting, hindsight reasoning is impermissible in both novelty (35 U.S.C. 
§ 102) and nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103) analyses. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 
U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (cautioning factfinders to be aware of hindsight bias and its reliance on ex 
post reasoning); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (discussing the need to “guard 
against slipping into use of hindsight” (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & 
Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (1964)); In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 974 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (warning 
against “hindsight anticipation[],” in which the applicant’s disclosure is used as a guide to dissect 
and recombine references to describe specific compounds within the meaning of § 102); In re 
Sporck, 301 F.2d 686, 690–91 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (explaining the court’s unwillingness to substitute 
speculation and hindsight appraisal of the prior art for factual evidence of nonobviousness). It is 
important to note that Ruschig-type “hindsight anticipation” is inapposite when a compound is 
specifically recited by name or structure. See Andrew Chin, Artful Prior Art and the Quality of 
DNA Patents, 57 ALA. L. REV. 975, 1000 (2006) (exploring anticipation issues that can arise 
when the asserted prior art reference discloses a voluminous list of compounds). Nonetheless, 
hindsight problems might arise when the examiner is allowed to pick and choose among 
documents to describe what the PHOSITA knew in the past. 
 120. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1402 (2006) (citing 
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). 
 121. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1199 (2002); see also R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent 
Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 205 (2002) (“[In considering] 
enablement, which is measured through the lens of the knowledge of the relevant field as of the 
filing date of the patent application[, a]s the filing date becomes distant, the potential for 
cognitive biases, such as a hindsight bias, increases.” (footnote omitted)). 
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conventional technique did not work with an added copper catalyst.122 
An applicant may thus need to engage in actual experimentation to 
prove that an allegedly anticipatory reference is nonenabling. Herein 
lies a major paradox: A bedrock principle of patent law is that an 
inventor need not engage in any actual experimentation before 
obtaining a patent.123 So it seems odd that an inventor, who is not 
required to physically reduce X to practice in order to prove § 112 
enablement, may have to engage in experimentation to prove that a 
reference is nonenabling. Savvy third-party patentees accordingly 
have an incentive to purposely create novelty hurdles for subsequent 
inventors by strategically disclosing unclaimed, unmade compounds 
in their patents.124 
 
 122. See Sasse, 629 F.2d at 681–82 (“It was incumbent upon appellants to rebut the 
presumed operability of the copper catalyst method described in [the organic textbook]. As did 
the [B]oard, we find the Sasse declaration devoid of any persuasive factual bases for dismissing 
the proposed catalytic synthesis. Sasse does not employ any copper catalyst in the attempted 
preparation of the precursors.” (emphasis added)). 
 123. It is well settled in U.S. patent law that conception, and not any physical act, is the key 
facet of the inventive process. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1999) (“[T]he 
word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather 
than to a physical embodiment of that idea.”); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 
F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[c]onception is the touchstone of 
inventorship,” which only requires “‘the formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and 
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention’” (quoting Hybritech Inc. v. 
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986))). Thus, an applicant who 
“constructively” reduces an invention to practice by merely filing a patent application 
presumably has complied with the disclosure requirements of § 112, including the obligation to 
enable a PHOSITA to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. Hybritech 
Inc., 802 F.2d at 1376. 
  There may be occasions, however, when an actual reduction to practice is a de facto 
requirement. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 646–52. For example, several 
cases suggest that an applicant must supply actual experimental data for inventions in 
unpredictable technologies in the early stages of development or when an applicant purports to 
invent something that is contrary to well-settled scientific principles. Id. 
 124. A document that specifically names thousands or millions of chemical compounds is 
referred to as a “shotgun” reference. In re Schoenewaldt, 343 F.2d 1000, 1002 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
Yet a shotgun reference can potentially anticipate each recited compound if the disclosure is 
sufficiently enabling. See infra note 192. 
  There are at least five reasons why a patentee would disclose subject matter but not 
claim it. First, a third party may intentionally disclose unclaimed material to create novelty 
problems for subsequent inventors. Second, it could be an unintentional error. See Michael J. 
Meuer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective 
on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1951–52 (2005) (explaining that an applicant’s 
ability to claim everything the applicant has enabled depends on the talent and effort of the 
inventor and patent prosecutor in identifying what has been enabled). Third, because the 
written description places an outer limit on claim scope, Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic 
Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999), one way to avoid § 112, ¶ 1, issues is 
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Fourth, given that the third-party patentee does not claim X, one 
might ask why is it reasonable to presume that the disclosed process 
for making it (A + B → X) will work. The key point here is that the 
Patent Office does not conduct a § 112 enablement analysis on 
unclaimed subject matter disclosed in an application.125 That subject 
matter is simply dedicated to the public.126 Thus, disclosing unclaimed 
subject matter is an excellent “defensive disclosure” strategy to 
thwart subsequent patent applicants.127 For example: 
[A third-party patentee] could . . . generate millions upon millions of 
plausible chemical structures and load them into multiple patent 
applications together with one compound that actually meets all of 
 
to draft a disclosure that is broader than the claims. Fourth, the applicant could strategically 
craft narrow claims to avoid scrutiny by the Patent Office during prosecution and then, after 
issuance, rely on the broad disclosure to enlarge the scope of the claims in litigation. See 
Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing this 
strategy). This tactic has been severely limited by the disclosure-dedication rule. See PSC 
Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining 
that the disclosure-dedication rule should “motivate patentees to draw the broadest claims that 
they consider to be patentable, and to submit the broad claims to the [Patent Office] for 
examination”); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is 
dedicated to the public). Fifth, an applicant may want to use continuation practice to gain 
advantages over competitors. See infra note 232. 
 125. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.08 (8th ed., rev. 8, 2010) [hereinafter MPEP] (“All 
questions of enablement are evaluated against the claimed subject matter.”); see also Engel 
Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Unclaimed subject matter 
is not subject to the disclosure requirements of § 112; the reasons are pragmatic: the disclosure 
would be boundless, and the pitfalls endless.”). 
 126. Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) (“[T]he claim of a specific 
device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the 
face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed.”); Johnson 
& Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1054 (“[W]hen a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject 
matter . . . this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public.”). This practice may 
trigger the disclosure-dedication rule, which bars a finding of patent infringement when an 
accused infringer practices disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. See supra note 124. 
 127. STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MAINTAINING 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 24 (2003), available at http://shr.aaas.org/tek/handbook/handbook.pdf. 
Defensive disclosure is “information or documentation intentionally made available to the 
public as prior art in order to render any subsequent claims of invention or discovery ineligible 
for a patent.” Id. Several commentators have explored the strategy of defensive publication. 
See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent 
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2175–76 (2000) (discussing a competitor’s strategic incentive to 
create prior art); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927 (2000) 
(same); sources cited infra notes 128–29. 
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the patentability [requirements] in each patent application. The 
applicant could then claim that enabled compound and get a patent 
issued on that compound and have the rest of the [disclosed but 
unclaimed] structures become enabled prior art . . . .128 
As one commentator explains, “This is a ‘spoiler’ tactic—you disclose 
your technology without pursuing patent protection for yourself just 
to be sure that no one else can have a patent for it either.”129 
B. The Quintessential Novelty Problem 
1. What Is It?  Several patent doctrines, including anticipatory 
enablement, emerged during the first century of the U.S. patent 
system, when inventions were still primarily mechanical devices.130 
The invention landscape changed around the time of World War II, 
when key breakthroughs in antibiotic, vitamin, and hormone research 
spawned the “therapeutic revolution”131 and led to the discovery of 
many first-generation “wonder drugs.”132 During this period, 
 
 128. CHRIS P. MILLER & MARK J. EVANS, THE CHEMIST’S COMPANION GUIDE TO PATENT 
LAW 170 n.4 (2010); see also Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the 
Patent Race, 48 J.L. & ECON. 173, 175 (2005) (“[These] disclosures are designed to preempt 
patents in instances where the disclosing firm does not itself plan to pursue patent protection 
but fears that its rivals might.”); Bill Barrett, Defensive Use of Publications in an Intellectual 
Property Strategy, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 191, 191–93 (2002) (providing strategies for drafting 
patent disclosures in unpredictable fields); infra note 161. 
 129. Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION: HARNESSING CREATIVITY 
FOR BUSINESS GROWTH 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003). 
 130. See John Hoxie, A Patent Attorney’s View, 47 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 630, 
636 (1965) (exploring the evolution of inventions from being mostly electrical-mechanical to 
chemical in nature); William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 
263–64 (1990) (same); supra note 54. Quite curiously, the first patent granted in the United 
States was for an improved method for making potash (potassium carbonate), America’s first 
industrial chemical. See U.S. Patent No. X1 (issued July 31, 1790). 
 131. NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 7–11 (1983); Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need 
for Reform, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 365–66 (1991) (describing the pharmaceutical industrial 
revolution). 
 132. See, e.g., Process for Obtaining Vitamins, U.S. Patent No. 2,049,988 (issued Aug. 4, 
1936) (Vitamin B1; assigned to Research Corporation); Alloxazines and Isoalloxazines and 
Processes for Their Production, U.S. Patent No. 2,261,608 (issued Nov. 4, 1941) (Vitamin B2; 
assigned to Merck); Process of Treating Pregnene Compounds, U.S. Patent No. 2,462,133 
(issued Feb. 22, 1949) (synthesis of cortisone; assigned to Merck). Interestingly, the familiar 
wonder drugs sulfanilamide (the first sulfa drug) and penicillin were unpatentable (for a lack of 
novelty) by the time their therapeutic properties came to light because the substances were 
already in the public domain. See Ronald Bentley, Different Roads to Discovery; Prontosil 
(Hence Sulfa Drugs) and Penicillin (Hence β-Lactams), 36 J. INDUS. MICROBIOLOGY & 
BIOTECH. 775, 775–86 (2009). 
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pharmaceutical companies quickly switched from a manufacturing to 
a research-based model and secured patents that allowed them to 
dominate sectors of specific therapeutic markets.133 This, in turn, 
quickly forced the Patent Office and the courts to wrestle with fields 
key to drug research, like organic chemistry.134 But the courts did so, 
at least initially, by rigidly applying mechanical-electrical patent 
doctrine to these unpredictable fields.135 This shoehorning led to 
 
 133. See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, supra note 131, at 7–11; Peter Drahos & John 
Braithwaite, Intellectual Property, Corporate Strategy, Globalization: TRIPS in Context, 20 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 451, 463–64 (2002) (explaining that during this era drug companies found patent 
protection vital because they knew that “[p]enicillin, which had not been patented, had gone 
from costing $3,955 per pound in 1945 to $282 per pound in 1950”); Peter Temin, Technology, 
Regulation, and Market Structure in the Modern Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 BELL J. ECON. 429, 
436 (1979) (describing the transformation of the pharmaceutical industry from a production to a 
research model). 
 134. See Noonan, supra note 130, at 263–69. The “antibiotic revolution” presents an 
interesting story. Given penicillin’s success and the potential for antibiotics to generate 
unprecedented profits, pharmaceutical companies sought other antibiotics by screening 
potential antibiotic-producing microorganisms from nature. GRAHAM DUTFIELD, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE 141–42 (2d ed. 2009). But “it was uncertain if the patent system and the courts could 
deliver [the blanket patent protection] they wanted” because the compounds were essentially 
“gifts of nature” and thus evinced very little inventive creativity. Id. at 142. Professor William 
Kingston describes how the pharmaceutical industry took quick action: 
The previous [Patent Act] dated from 1870, and did not suit the new methods of 
research needed for antibiotics . . . . On behalf of their pharmaceutical industry 
clients, New York Patent Bar Association members drafted a Bill and were able to 
get it introduced in Congress, and this, supplemented by other Bills and pressures, 
brought about the changes they wanted. 
William Kingston, Removing Some Harm from the World Trade Organization, 32 OXFORD 
DEV. STUD. 309, 310 (2004). The basic change was the incorporation of language in the 
nonobviousness provision of the 1952 Patent Act, see Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 
§ 1, 66 Stat. 792, 792, 798 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.) (“Patentability shall not be 
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”), tailored to keep the innovation 
threshold rather low. DUTFIELD, supra, at 142. 
 135. See Hoxie, supra note 130, at 636 (explaining how the judiciary tried to fit chemical 
inventions into the mold of mechanical-electrical inventions and contending that the judiciary’s 
interpretation of the patent statute did not change even as chemical inventions became more 
frequent). The courts quickly developed a bias against patent applications involving biological 
systems and pharmaceutical compounds. See Noonan, supra note 130, at 263–69. As an example, 
consider streptomycin, another first-generation wonder drug that is (like penicillin) a mold-
produced antibiotic. Historically, purified natural products were not always patentable. See Am. 
Wood-Paper Co. v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 593–94 (1874) (holding that 
purified cellulose was unpatentable although the process for obtaining it might be). Yet, in 1948, 
the Patent Office granted Merck a patent for streptomycin because the chemical modifications 
allowing it to be purified created a new composition of matter. See Complex Salts of 
Streptomycin and Process for Preparing Same, U.S. Patent No. 2,446,102 cols. 2.4–.8 (issued July 
27, 1948) (“[F]or the first time streptomycin is available in a form which not only has valuable 
therapeutic properties but also can be produced, distributed, and administered in a practicable 
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nonsensical outcomes and a disconnect between the judicial bench 
and the laboratory bench.136 And although a body of “unpredictable 
art” jurisprudence slowly developed to bridge the disconnect, several 
issues remain unsettled.137 
Perhaps the most important unresolved issue is whether and 
under what circumstances the appearance of a chemical name or 
structure in the prior art anticipates a subsequent inventor’s claim for 
the compound. Consider the hypothetical posed earlier: An inventor 
who files a patent application claiming compound X is faced with a 
third party’s prior patent that recites the structure of X (or includes it 
within a very small genus of compounds)138 but says little else about 
 
way.”); cf. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) 
(upholding a patent for a purified adrenaline salt because removing it from gland tissue 
produced a new composition of matter), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 196 F. 
496 (2d Cir. 1912). The streptomycin patent was an important legal development because “it 
clarified to the industry that the new antibiotics were patentable despite being ‘products of 
nature.’” GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 300 (2008). 
 136. The law of patents as applied to the experimental sciences has been described as “a 
child (or orphan) of mechanical patent law.” Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical 
Patents—A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 768, 783 (1969). 
 137. See, e.g., Jackie Hutter, Note, A Definite and Permanent Idea? Invention in the 
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Sciences and the Determination of Conception in Patent Law, 28 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 687, 719–21 (1995) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should adopt a 
standard of invention tailored to meet the needs of unpredictable activities like drug discovery). 
 138. It is well settled that the disclosure of a small genus may be sufficient to anticipate a 
species, even if the species is not specifically recited. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue 
Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The test is if a PHOSITA can “at once 
envisage” each member of the limited class of compounds. In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 
(C.C.P.A. 1962). For example, suppose X is a salt with the formula Na4Fe(CN)5F. The examiner 
finds a third-party patent that discloses “a salt with the formula Na4Fe(CN)5(halide).” Given 
that a PHOSITA (or anyone who has taken a general chemistry course) knows that there are 
only five halides (F, Cl, Br, I, At), the disclosure almost certainly meets the Petering test. In 
other words, the third-party patent “has described to [the PHOSITA] each of the various 
premutations [sic] . . . involved as fully as if [the patentee] had drawn each structural formula or 
had written each [by] name.” Id. at 682. Thus, if the disclosure is enabling, the third-party patent 
might be sufficient to anticipate a subsequent claim to X, even though X is not specifically 
recited. But just because the genus is small (as in the case of the halides) does not mean that 
enablement of one member of the group is always sufficient to enable the others. For an 
example explaining that, because the other halides require different reaction protocols, the 
general method used to prepare aryl chlorides and aryl bromides from diazonium salts and 
copper does not work for them, see MICHAEL B. SMITH & JERRY MARCH, MARCH’S 
ADVANCED ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 984 (6th ed. 2007). 
  The case of In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623 (C.C.P.A. 1938), also illustrates this point. The 
applicant attempted to claim the product and process of reacting a butadiene moiety with a 
hydrogen halide. Id. at 623. The written description disclosed the reaction of natural rubber 
(which contains a butadiene moiety) with hydrogen fluoride. Id. at 624. After noting that the 
application dealt with an obscure and complex reaction, the examiner rejected several broad 
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it.139 Because the structure recited in the prior art and the one claimed 
in the patent application are identical, the key question in the novelty 
analysis is not one of strict identity but one of enablement: whether 
the teachings of the prior patent, together with the PHOSITA’s 
knowledge at that time, were sufficient to place X in possession of the 
public.140 Although the Patent Office and the courts began grappling 
with this issue during the earliest days of the chemical era,141 it is one 
that inventors aggressively fight today.142 And so it is, at least within 
the realm of the unpredictable arts, the quintessential novelty 
problem. 
2. Exacerbation.  The judiciary’s early response to the 
quintessential novelty problem revealed its unfamiliarity and 
discomfort with complex technologies. And somewhat clumsy 
reasoning in an early decision only exacerbated the problem. In the 
1942 case In re Von Bramer,143 the Patent Office rejected a claim to X 
because it appeared in a voluminous list of compounds recited in a 
third-party patent. On appeal, Von Bramer argued that an 
anticipatory reference must disclose “a sufficient number of [X’s] 
physical and chemical attributes” or, alternatively, a process that 
 
claims for nonenablement because “no implied or direct statements can be found in the 
application, as originally filed, that the other hydrogen halides will react similarly to give the 
same product.” Id. The applicant contended that the disclosure of one member of a well-known 
small group was sufficient to enable claims covering the entire group. Id. The court affirmed the 
Board’s rejection, explaining that “[c]ertain members of a well-defined group of chemicals may 
be equivalents for one purpose and not equivalents for another. Experimentation is required to 
ascertain the particular action of a member of the group upon the particular material to be 
treated.” Id. at 625 (emphasis added). Applying Soll to the hypothetical presented above, even 
if the third-party patent were to disclose a method for making, for example, Na4Fe(CN)5I, it 
would not necessarily enable a method for making Na4Fe(CN)5F. 
 139. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra Part I. 
 141. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 142. See, e.g., In re ’639 Patent Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 157, 172–87 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(determining that the claims of a patent that recited a compound were invalid due to 
anticipation by a prior art reference), aff’d, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Copley Pharm., Inc., 
45 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ex parte Nicolaou, No. 2007-1076, 2007 WL 3408644, at *4 
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 13, 2007) (reversing an examiner’s rejection of claims to compounds because the 
prior art’s disclosure was nonenabling). In its appellate role, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences reviews adverse decisions of examiners. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006). An applicant 
whose claims have been twice rejected by the examiner may appeal to the Board. Id. § 134(a). 
The Board can affirm a rejection or reverse and remand to the examining corps. 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.197 (2009) (promulgating Patent Office regulations pertaining to the Board). An applicant 
dissatisfied with a Board decision can appeal to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006). 
 143. In re Von Bramer, 127 F.2d 149 (C.C.P.A. 1942). 
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unquestionably produces it.144 The C.C.P.A. disagreed and held that a 
reference depicting the name or structure of X was sufficient to 
anticipate a subsequent claim to it even if the reference did not 
disclose an operative process for making the compound.145 Although it 
cited a nineteenth-century Supreme Court patent case to support its 
holding,146 the Von Bramer court notably failed to mention 
enablement or to explicitly discuss what was known in the art at the 
time of the third-party patent.147 And regardless of what the court 
meant to say,148 the holding and dicta quickly morphed into the “Von 
Bramer doctrine,” which held that “the mere name [of a compound,] 
without more[,] anticipates.”149 
Even if the C.C.P.A. felt that Von Bramer had been misread, 
subsequent opinions addressing the quintessential novelty problem 
did not immediately bear this out. To the contrary, the court cited the 
doctrine as doctrine and even expanded its breadth.150 For instance, in 
 
 144. Id. at 152. Thirty-six years later, Judge Baldwin made a similar argument: “A 
compound is described by a reference, in my view, if the reference recites the structure and 
recites or reliably and accurately predicts at least one significant property of the 
compound. . . . I would treat the actual existence of the compound as legally equivalent to such a 
significant property.” In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 564 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
 145. Von Bramer, 127 F.2d at 151. 
 146. See Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, 377 (1876) (“It is quite immaterial, even if it 
be a fact, that the [third-party patent’s disclosure] is insufficient to teach a manufacturer how to 
make the patented corset. It is enough if it sufficiently describes the corset itself.”). For further 
discussion of this case, see supra note 54. In contrast to corset making, organic chemistry is an 
unpredictable art. See supra note 46. Nonetheless, it appears that the Von Bramer court may 
have taken dictum in Cohn out of context. See Von Bramer, 127 F.2d at 152 (citing Cohn for the 
proposition that “[i]t is not necessary that a reference patent for a device or chemical compound 
disclose an operative process for producing the article or product”). 
 147. Twenty years later, the C.C.P.A. explained that a consideration of knowledge in the art 
was “implicit” in the Von Bramer opinion. See In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 942 (C.C.P.A. 1962) 
(stating that there is an assumption that a PHOSITA will use his knowledge in combination 
with the printed materials). 
 148. The opinion included an excerpt from the examiner’s correspondence, which stated 
that the compound-at-issue “ha[s] generally predictable properties such as found for any similar 
N-alkyl amino phenol, and is generally capable of synthesis by the recognized classical organic 
reactions.” Von Bramer, 127 F.2d at 152. Two decades later, Judge Jackson (the author of the 
Von Bramer opinion) stated that this so-called predictability was a relevant consideration. 
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Ladd, 219 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D.D.C. 1963); accord In re Brown, 329 F.2d 
1006, 1010 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (suggesting that predictability should be considered in evaluation of 
claims). But trying to classify organic synthesis as predictable, even for compounds within the 
same class, can be problematic. See supra note 46. 
 149. Donald G. Daus, Chemical Names as Anticipation and Support, 70 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 377, 381 (1988). 
 150. See In re Stoll, 161 F.2d 241, 243 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (“A compound previously described 
by name in a printed publication such as an issued patent is a disclosure which is sufficient to 
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a 1956 case in which an applicant submitted proof that the third 
party’s method for making X did not work, the C.C.P.A. held that 
“[i]t is well settled . . . that a reference which clearly names a 
compound or identifies it by structural formula constitutes a full 
anticipation of a claim to that compound, even though the reference 
contains only an inoperative method for producing the compound, or 
no method at all.”151 
Although commentators immediately argued that Von Bramer 
had been read out of context,152 the Patent Office took the absolute 
position that the mere recitation of X by name or structure in a 
reference, even if done by accident or typographical error, served as a 
complete anticipation.153 And if the reference lacked an operative 
method for making X, whether a PHOSITA could rely on knowledge 
in the art to make it was seemingly immaterial.154 
Twenty years elapsed before the C.C.P.A. attempted to put the 
Von Bramer doctrine to rest.155 The decision to abandon the doctrine 
 
support the rejection of a claim for that compound.”); In re Crosley, 159 F.2d 735, 736 (C.C.P.A. 
1947) (“Furthermore, this court is committed to the doctrine that where a product is clearly 
disclosed in a publication, the operativeness of any of the processes by which it is claimed the 
product could be produced is immaterial, and that the disclosure of the composition is sufficient 
to anticipate a claim therefor.”); see also Daus, supra note 149, at 381–83 (tracing the 
development of the doctrine); Maurice W. Levy, Von Bramer: A Plea for Reorientation, 33 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 401, 401–27 (1951) (same). 
 151. In re Baranauckas, 228 F.2d 413, 415 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 152. See Daus, supra note 149, at 382–83 (arguing that Von Bramer was “carried to 
extremes”); Levy, supra note 150, at 401 (arguing that the Von Bramer doctrine evolved from 
reading dicta out of context). 
 153. See WEGNER, supra note 38, § 129, at 173–74 (explaining that misprints naming a 
particular structure were sufficient to anticipate); Levy, supra note 150, at 401–03 (collecting 
cases and suggesting that examiners felt constrained to make this type of rejection even if it was 
substantively unsound). 
 154. Levy, supra note 150, at 402. For example, see Ex Parte Nagy, 106 U.S.P.Q. 424, 425 
(P.T.O. Bd. App. 1955) (holding that a compound recited in the prior art was sufficient to 
anticipate even though the prior art method of preparation failed). 
 155. In re Brown, 329 F.2d 1006, 1010 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (“To the extent that anyone may 
draw an inference from the Von Bramer case that the mere printed conception . . . of a 
‘compound’ is sufficient to show that [it] is old [for § 102 or § 103 purposes], we totally 
disagree.”); In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 942 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating that the court disagrees 
with any case, including Von Bramer, that conflicts with Cohn). Why did the C.C.P.A. change its 
mind? It may have done so due to several substantial enhancements to the court’s technical 
competence. First, the addition of Judges Giles Rich and Arthur Smith (author of LeGrice) in 
the 1950s brought technical astuteness and patent expertise to the court. See GILES S. RICH, A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 131–33, 
143–44 (1980) (discussing the appointments of Judges Rich and Smith to the C.C.P.A. and 
describing each of these judges’ professional backgrounds). Second, in 1955, Judge Eugene 
Worley (later Chief Judge) argued that each judge on the C.C.P.A. should have a technical 
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was due in no small part to the wisdom of Judge Giles S. Rich, co-
drafter of the 1952 Patent Act. He wrote in In re Papesch156 that a 
formula does not describe a compound: 
  From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its 
properties are inseparable; they are one and the same thing. The 
graphic formulae, the chemical nomenclature, [and] the systems of 
classification . . . are mere symbols by which compounds can be 
identified, classified, and compared. But a formula is not a 
compound[,] and while it may serve in a claim to identify what is 
being patented, as the metes and bounds of a deed identify a plot of 
land, the thing that is patented is not the formula but the compound 
identified by it.157 
Guided by this reasoning, the C.C.P.A. held in In re Wiggins158 that 
merely naming a compound in a reference, without more, is 
inadequate to describe it because the mere recitation “constitute[s] 
nothing more than speculation about [its] potential or theoretical 
existence.”159 Judge Almond explained what would happen if the 
court were to hold otherwise: 
[L]ists of thousands of theoretically possible compounds could be 
generated and published which, assuming it would be within the 
level of skill in the art to make them, would bar a patent to the 
actual discoverer of a named compound no matter how beneficial to 
mankind it might be. In view of the fact that the purpose sought to 
be effectuated by the patent law is the encouragement of innovation, 
such a result would be repugnant to the statute.160 
 
advisor to assist in patent cases. Id. at 118–19. He envisioned a group of advisors “thoroughly 
skilled in the advanced fields of electronics, chemistry, and related sciences” to assist with the 
“increasing volume and technicalities” of the court’s patent docket. Id. at 119. Although Judge 
Worley initially faced resistance from his colleagues, the court hired its first technical advisor, 
the (former) Solicitor of the Patent Office, that same year. Id. at 118–19. Eventually the 
C.C.P.A. judges began a tradition of hiring technically trained law clerks, giving the court “a 
considerable pool of technological assistance” that was kept fresh because newer clerks had 
“the latest training in their respective fields.” Id. at 121. 
 156. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
 157. Id. at 391 (first emphasis added); cf. Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 
1111, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Indeed, a chemical structure is simply a means of describing a 
compound; it is not the invention itself.”). 
 158. In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 159. Id. at 543; cf. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 635 (2d Cir. 1942) 
(“[A]nother’s experiment, imperfect and never perfected, will not serve either as an anticipation 
or as part of the prior art, for it has not served to enrich it.”). 
 160. Wiggins, 488 F.2d at 543. 
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But despite efforts to put Von Bramer to rest, the case had 
already left its mark on patent law. It opened the door for third 
parties to pad the patent literature with voluminous lists of unmade 
compounds to hinder bona fide claims to those compounds down the 
road.161 And Von Bramer planted a seed in patent jurisprudence that 
blossomed into the notion that a PHOSITA can figure out how to 
make a compound just from knowing something about its structure.162 
3. Unresolved Issues.  The courts now use the enablement-
possession test to handle the quintessential novelty problem.163 
Although this test is substantively better than the harsh Von Bramer 
doctrine, there are still unresolved issues. Dividing the post–Von 
Bramer cases into two categories helps to unpack the lingering issues 
and to shed light on the problems they cause for subsequent 
inventors. 
The first category addresses situations in which the allegedly 
anticipatory reference discloses an unsuccessful attempt to make X. 
In In re Sheppard164 and In re Wiggins, the C.C.P.A. held that such a 
reference is insufficient to anticipate, particularly if there is no 
evidence of record that a PHOSITA could make X at the time of the 
reference.165 More recently, the Federal Circuit relied on Sheppard 
and Wiggins to craft a per se rule that a reference describing an 
experimental failure is nonenabling.166 
 
 161. Interestingly, the court hinted at this problem during the Von Bramer era: 
At the same time, however, though our decision is compelled by the existing law, we 
feel constrained to point out that there are limits to the [Von Bramer] 
doctrine . . . . What the precise boundary lines are, we are unable now to discern. 
Certainly they do not extend so far as to permit publication of theoretical lists of 
hundreds or thousands of possible compounds to deny patent protection on such 
compounds to those who actually discovered them later. The exact boundaries will 
have to be delineated on a case by case basis. 
In re Baranauckas, 228 F.2d 413, 416 (C.C.P.A. 1956). For a discussion of defensive publication, 
see supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra Part II.A. 
 163. See supra Part I.B. 
 164. In re Sheppard, 339 F.2d 238 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 165. Wiggins, 488 F.2d at 542–44 (explaining that although the reference described X by 
name, its failed synthesis, plus the lack of evidence that a PHOSITA could make it at that time, 
made the reference nonenabling); Sheppard, 339 F.2d at 241 (explaining that X’s decomposition 
during synthesis created uncertainty about the reference’s teaching and thus made the 
disclosure nonenabling). Neither opinion cites United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1996), in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[a]n inoperable invention or one which fails to 
achieve its intended result does not negative novelty.” Id. at 50 (citing Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 
1, 17 (1935)). 
 166. See infra note 177. 
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The second category includes those situations in which X appears 
in an allegedly anticipatory reference (the primary reference) with no 
intrinsic synthetic details. In other words, the primary reference 
either does not disclose an attempt to make X or states that X can be 
made from general methods known in the art. Interestingly, In re 
Samour167 and subsequent cases make clear that the examiner may 
rely on one or more secondary references to prove that the 
PHOSITA was capable of making X at the time of the primary 
reference.168 Although this may raise concerns about the single-
reference rule required for anticipation,169 reliance on secondary 
references does not transform the inquiry into one concerning 
nonobviousness,170 the lack of which can be established by combining 
the teachings of multiple prior art references.171 In sum, a primary 
reference that merely recites X’s structure satisfies strict identity, 
whereas the secondary reference, by showing that there is sufficient 
knowledge in the art to make X, shows possession.172 So, in a sense, 
“[a] reference that was not enabling upon its publication can become 
 
 167. In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 168. See Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing 
the “modest flexibility” in the single-reference rule that allows a secondary reference to 
accommodate situations in which the PHOSITA’s knowledge cannot be gleaned from the 
primary reference); In re Donahue, 766 F.2d 531, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying Samour to 
affirm a Patent Office multiple-reference rejection for a lack of novelty); Studiengesellschaft 
Kohle, M.B.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 724, 726–27 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (recognizing the 
“caveat” to the single-reference rule); Samour, 571 F.2d at 562–63 (explaining that while a single 
prior art reference must disclose each and every element of the claimed compound, the 
examiner may rely on additional references to show that a PHOSITA had sufficient knowledge 
to make it). The secondary reference can even postdate the primary reference. See Samour, 571 
F.2d at 563 (explaining that the relevant inquiry is whether the compound was already in 
possession of the public more than one year prior to the applicant’s filing date under § 102(b) 
and not whether evidence showing such possession came before or after the date of the primary 
reference). 
 169. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 170. Lack of novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102) and lack of nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103) are 
substantively distinct grounds for denying patentability. Most would agree that nonobviousness 
only comes into play after the novelty inquiry is complete. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (explaining that an applicant must “hav[e] separate keys to open in succession 
the three doors of sections 101, 102, and 103”) (emphasis added)), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 171. For novelty, all of the claim elements are found within the primary reference. Samour, 
571 F.2d at 563. By contrast, obviousness is often shown when the claim elements are found 
across multiple references. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1363–64 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the distinction). Nonetheless, the prior art used for a 
nonobviousness rejection must also be enabling. See discussion supra note 104. 
 172. In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (discussing Samour and how its 
holding still comports with the single-reference rule). 
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enabling and therefore an anticipation at a later time when additional 
[references] become[] available.”173 
A good illustration of this second scenario is In re Donahue.174 
There, the allegedly anticipatory reference was a 1970 journal article 
that recited the structure of X but did not explain how to make it. The 
examiner rejected Donahue’s claim to X, contending that secondary 
sources, including a third-party patent that issued in 1975, showed 
that a PHOSITA could have relied on knowledge in the art to make 
X in 1970.175 In affirming the rejection, the Federal Circuit explained 
that the use of secondary references to show the level of skill in the 
art is not inconsistent with the general rule that each element of a 
claim must be found in a single prior art document.176 
Having explained the two types of cases, it is now possible to 
explore several problems with the current regime. First, given that the 
disclosure of an unsuccessful attempt to synthesize X makes a 
reference insufficient to anticipate,177 third parties have a strong 
incentive to conceal experimental failures so as to maximize the 
document’s novelty-defeating potential. This is because a reference’s 
silence with respect to an attempt to make X “does not indicate one 
way or the other” whether it is enabling.178 
The problem here is that disclosing experimental failure is good 
for both scientific progress and the innovation-related goals of the 
patent system.179 At minimum, the disclosure saves time and money 
 
 173. Chisum, supra note 31, at 63 (emphasis added). 
 174. In re Donahue, 766 F.2d 531 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 175. Id. at 532. 
 176. Id. at 534. 
 177. In attempting to distinguish Donahue from the Sheppard-Wiggins scenario, the Federal 
Circuit stated, 
In those cases, the references were deemed insufficient, because they stated that 
attempts to prepare the claimed compounds were unsuccessful. Such failures by those 
skilled in the art (having possession of the information disclosed by the publication) 
are strong evidence that the disclosure of the publication was nonenabling. 
Id. at 533; see also Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(noting that a failed experiment reported in a third-party patent makes it irrelevant as a prior 
art reference). 
 178. See Donahue, 766 F.2d at 533 (“By contrast, the fact that the author of a publication did 
not attempt to make his disclosed invention does not indicate one way or the other whether the 
publication would have been enabling.”). 
 179. See, e.g., GERARD H. GAYNOR, INNOVATION BY DESIGN 140 (2002) (observing that 
experimental failure is part of the innovative process and that lessons can be learned from it); 
ALVIN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT 213 (1990) (“Innovation . . . requires experimental failure to 
achieve success.”). 
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by preventing the repetition of dead-end experiments.180 There is 
indeed hope that reading the details of the failed experiment will 
induce innovative thinking to solve that specific problem or others.181 
In sum, disclosing experimental failures is something that the patent 
system should encourage. 
Second, it is not immediately clear why experimental failure 
should be dispositive on the enablement issue because the cases make 
clear that the PHOSITA’s knowledge is also important. Consider In 
re Jacobs,182 in which the applicant argued that a third-party patent 
should be insufficient to anticipate because the disclosed process for 
making X did not work.183 Affirming the rejection, the C.C.P.A. 
explained that “[i]n order for appellants to prevail, and in view of the 
[third-party patent’s] disclosure, we think that appellants have the 
burden of proving that [the disclosed] process was not operative to 
produce [X] and could not be made operative by use of ordinary skill 
of the art.”184 Thus, the PHOSITA may have sufficient knowledge to 
 
 180. FREDERICK GRINNELL, EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF SCIENCE 9 (2009). As one 
commentator notes, 
  Physical scientists often publish their failed experiments. Though not as satisfying 
as successful ones, certain failures give information that is truly useful. If nothing else, 
a well-documented failure says, “You don’t have to bother with this technique. It 
doesn’t work, at least not . . . the way I tried it.” . . . [Thus p]hysical scientists, in 
publishing their failures, help their brethren . . . . 
BRUCE JACKSON, FIELDWORK 14 (1987). 
 181. See ALAN AXELROD, EDISON ON INNOVATION 40–42 (2008) (describing Thomas 
Edison’s view that failed experiments always provide useful information and thus are not really 
failures at all); DOROTHY LEONARD-BARTON, WELLSPRINGS OF KNOWLEDGE 119–20 (1998) 
(exploring the role of failed experiments in knowledge building); STEFAN H. THOMKE, 
EXPERIMENTATION MATTERS: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
INNOVATION 23 (2003) (“Innovators learn from failure . . . . [K]nowledge of either failure or 
success itself can be stockpiled, providing a resource that, if not applicable to one set of 
experiments, can be used for subsequent inquiries.”). Failed experiments can lead to accidental 
discoveries, thereby converting failure into success. See LEONARD-BARTON, supra, at 120 
(recounting the story of penicillin); Seymore, Serendipity, supra note 45, at 192–211 (exploring 
the role of accidental discoveries in patent law). 
 182. In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d 743 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
 183. See id. at 745 (“[A]ppellants’ argument in effect is that the disclosure in the Miller 
patent is inoperable to produce [X] and hence in error.”). The applicant’s argument that the 
disclosed method did not work raises an interesting technical question. As one commentator 
explains, “It is all too easy for a skilled person to say that he tried, but failed, to prepare a prior 
art compound, but is that because his task was impossible or because he performed the task 
incompetently, or at least not so competently as other skilled workers might do?” White, supra 
note 31, at 318. 
 184. Jacobs, 318 F.2d at 745 (emphasis added). 
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make X even if the process disclosed in the third-party patent fails.185 
So it is somewhat curious that the Federal Circuit has drawn such a 
sharp distinction between the Sheppard-Wiggins and Samour-
Donahue scenarios. 
Third, contrary to the strong language used in Wiggins, it appears 
that a third-party patent’s mere recitation of X by name or structure 
is, as a practical matter, sufficient to anticipate a subsequent 
inventor’s claim to the compound. Why is this so? To begin, the mere 
appearance of X in the third-party patent meets novelty’s strict-
identity requirement in that it discloses each and every element of the 
subject matter to be claimed (X).186 Even if the primary reference 
provides no experimental details, all the examiner has to do is 
assemble secondary references that suggest that the PHOSITA was 
capable of making X at the time of the primary reference. This, in 
fact, is the Samour-Donahue scenario.187 The problem here is that 
even if there is no dispute that the subsequent inventor was the first 
to actually make X, the compound lacks novelty and is therefore 
unpatentable as a new composition of matter because it probably 
could have been made in the prior art.188 This disturbing result 
suggests that the Von Bramer doctrine, in fact, never died. 
 
 185. The Patent Office has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to make this argument. See In re 
Coker, 463 F.2d 1344, 1346–48 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (rejecting the Board’s argument that a 
PHOSITA in the field of organic chemistry is well aware of numerous methods for making 
compounds like X even though the third-party patentee was unsuccessful in doing so). 
 186. For a hypothetical example, see supra note 84. 
 187. See supra notes 167–76 and accompanying text. 
 188. The subsequent inventor can possibly obtain a “new use” patent for X even if it is 
known in the prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (defining a patentable “process” to 
“include[] a new use of a known . . . composition of matter, or material”); Merck & Co., Inc. v. 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that a new use for a 
known compound can be patented with a “method” claim). There are, however, two principal 
reasons why a “compound” or “composition of matter claim” covering X itself tends to be more 
valuable than those directed to a specific “method of making” or “method of using” X. First, 
compound claims afford the broadest protection. As Professor Harold Wegner explains, 
Compound claims have always been the premium form of patent protection in the 
chemical industry . . . . A claim to the compound, per se, dominates every method of 
making that compound and every single use of that compound, every single mixture 
of different components that includes that compound, and every end use composition 
inclusive of the compound. 
WEGNER, supra note 38, § 260, at 301; see also In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963) 
(discussing the “well-recognized advantages” of composition-of-matter claims); MARTIN A. 
VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA & PHARMACEUTICAL 
LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 82–85 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the “hierarchy” of patent claims 
and noting that composition patents are the best for pharmaceuticals). 
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III.  REFRAMING THE NOVELTY INQUIRY 
The quintessential novelty problem endures because vestiges of 
the Von Bramer doctrine remain. Though a document that merely 
recites X by name or structure cannot by itself defeat patentability,189 
that modicum of disclosure is still sufficient to satisfy the first prong 
of the anticipation inquiry.190 And because the examiner can easily 
satisfy the second prong by using any additional references to show 
that a PHOSITA could rely on knowledge in the art to make X,191 
establishing a prima facie case of anticipation is relatively easy. In 
 
  Second and relatedly, method patents are difficult to enforce because the patentee 
“acquires only the right to preclude others from using the chemical in the exact manner he has 
disclosed.” Eggert, supra note 136, at 781. Thus, the new-use patent might be too narrow to 
cover other uses for X that come to the fore during its lifespan. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The 
Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005) (“The discovery 
of a new use for an old drug might support a patent on a method of treatment, but such a patent 
offers little effective protection against generic competition once the drug itself is off-patent and 
may lawfully be sold for an older, unpatented use.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the 
FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2007) [hereinafter 
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA] (“Patents on particular methods of treatment involving the use 
of a drug are generally considered less valuable[] because they cannot be used to stop 
competitors from selling the same product for other uses.”); Roin, supra note 35, at 548 n.243 
(describing ways to avoid infringing a new-use patent). 
  Third, a patentee seeking a new-use claim may face a formidable nonobviousness 
hurdle. See Allegheny Drop Forge Co. v. Portec, Inc., 541 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1976) (“A new 
use for an old process or product is patentable if the new use or application is itself not ‘obvious’ 
to [a PHOSITA].”); Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1100 (2007) (explaining that in the drug context, a new-use patent “may 
be difficult to obtain because the ‘new’ use may have been obvious, even if it was not obvious 
that the new use would be effective”). 
  But despite these drawbacks, a method patent can provide fairly strong protection in 
certain situations. See, e.g., Lorie Ann Morgan & Jeffrey Tidwell, Patents: United States 
Perspective, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHARMACEUTICAL TECHNOLOGY 2616, 2617 (James 
Swarbick ed., 3d ed. 2007) (arguing that method-of-use claims can afford important protection 
for pharmaceuticals because FDA approval is linked to specific therapeutic uses); Kevin 
Outterson, Death from the Public Domain?, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 45, 50 (2009), http://
www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol87/pdf/87TexasLRevSeeAlso45.pdf (observing 
that if X is already patented or in the public domain, pharmaceutical companies will seek claims 
for new uses or formulations). Perhaps not surprisingly, savvy patentees who pursue 
composition-of-matter claims to X often also include at least one method-of-use claim so that if 
an opponent (in litigation) uncovers prior art sufficient to invalidate the former, the patentee 
will retain a strong patent position. WEGNER, supra note 38, § 261, at 302. 
  Yet regardless of the potential availability of a method-of-use patent, a subsequent 
inventor should not have to settle for one if the asserted prior art has not truly enabled X; the 
subsequent inventor should still be able to claim the compound itself. 
 189. See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 84, 186 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 167–76 and accompanying text. 
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sum, X’s mere appearance in a document often places it on the fast 
track to anticipation. Considering the presumptions and proof 
problems described above, a subsequent inventor’s attempt to patent 
X can be difficult if not impossible. To solve this problem, this Part 
offers a new analytical framework for gauging X’s novelty. 
A. A New Paradigm 
1. Mechanics.  Determining which references should be available 
to the examiner lies at the core of the quintessential novelty problem. 
The first question is whether a third-party patent merely reciting X 
should even serve as anticipatory prior art. The second question is 
whether there should be a limit on the potential universe of 
secondary references that can be used to prove that the PHOSITA 
could make X at the time of the primary reference. 
First, a third-party patent would not enjoy a presumption of 
enablement under the new paradigm. Determining whether the 
document can serve as prior art for anticipation purposes would 
depend on the amount of relevant, substantive technical information 
it discloses. For instance, if X appears among a voluminous list of 
compounds with no technical information about X’s synthesis, then 
the document would be insufficient to serve as anticipatory prior art 
because the mere recitation of chemical name or structure adds 
nothing to the storehouse of knowledge.192 Thus, in contrast to the 
current regime, the third-party patent’s mere recitation of a name or 
structure would not, without more, raise a presumption that the 
reference is enabled. Logically, if a third-party patent disclosing an 
unsuccessful attempt to make X is insufficient to anticipate, it is hard 
to understand why one merely reciting a structure warrants different 
(or better) treatment.193 
 
 192. Technically speaking, it is possible for a shotgun reference (one reciting a voluminous 
list of compounds) to sufficiently enable each recited compound. See In re Sivaramakrishnan, 
673 F.2d 1383, 1384–85 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that in contrast to Wiggins and the applicant’s 
contention that the disclosure was speculative, a PHOSITA could follow the reference’s 
teachings and rely on knowledge in the art to make the specific compound at issue, even though 
the teaching was generic); Ex Parte A, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1716, 1718–19 (B.P.A.I. 1990) (explaining 
that if a reference specifically teaches a listed compound, the reference anticipates regardless of 
the size of the list). 
 193. See CURTIS, supra note 49, § 292 (explaining that speculations about an experiment 
lacking in practical direction “are entirely analogous in their character to abortive and 
unsuccessful experiments in practice”). 
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On the other hand, if the document discloses a theoretical 
method for making X, in the first instance the disclosure would be 
presumed nonenabling because unpredictability in the art would raise 
an inference that undue experimentation would be required to make 
the compound.194 The presumption could be rebutted, but unlike 
under the current framework, the examiner would have the initial 
burden of proving enablement by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Rebuttal would require the examiner to show that the prior art 
provided some specific technique that enabled a PHOSITA to make 
X.195 Here, the examiner could point to information disclosed in the 
third-party patent itself and, as discussed below, a limited universe of 
secondary references. If the examiner rebuts the presumption, the 
burden would shift to the applicant to rebut the examiner’s 
contention of enablement, just as in the current framework. And 
although the burden of production could shift back and forth, in the 
new paradigm the ultimate burden of persuasion would still rest with 
the examiner.196 Thus, if the examiner could not carry the burden, the 
allegedly anticipating reference would be insufficient to anticipate.197 
Second, the new analytical framework would limit the universe 
of secondary references that could be used to prove that a PHOSITA 
could make X at the time of the primary reference. Importantly, only 
documents with publication dates earlier than or contemporaneous 
with the third-party patent could be used for this purpose. The 
 
 194. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 195. The principle that anticipatory prior art must provide specific details finds its roots in 
English patent cases: 
Whatever, therefore, is essential to the invention must [appear in] the prior 
publication. If specific details are necessary for the practical working . . . of the 
alleged invention, they must be found substantially in the prior publication. Apparent 
generality, or a proposition not true to its full extent, will not prejudice a subsequent 
statement which is limited and accurate . . . .  
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 n.24 (1870) (citing Hill v. Evans, (1862) 45 Eng. 
Rep. 1195, 1200 (Q.B.)). In a leading British case addressing anticipatory enablement, Lord 
Hoffmann described the requisite level of disclosure for a third-party patent: 
To anticipate the [subsequent inventor’s] claim the prior publication must contain 
clear and unmistakable directions to do what the [subsequent inventor] claims to have 
invented. A signpost, however clear, upon the road to the . . . invention will not 
suffice. The prior inventor must be clearly shown to have planted his flag at the 
precise destination before the [subsequent inventor]. 
Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., [1972] R.P.C. 457, 486 (U.K.) 
(citations omitted). 
 196. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 197. And if there are no additional grounds for unpatentability, the Patent Office must grant 
the patent. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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examiner could no longer point to recent documents to prove what a 
PHOSITA knew long ago. And like the primary reference and other 
forms of prior art, the secondary reference must have been 
“sufficiently accessible” to the PHOSITA during the relevant time 
period.198 Limiting the universe of secondary references in this way 
would reduce problems with hindsight stemming from speculation 
about the PHOSITA’s then-existing abilities.199 
2. Application.  To illustrate the new analytical framework, 
consider the following hypothetical patent prosecution, which shows 
that novelty problems can arise even when X does not appear in a 
voluminous list of compounds. 
Suppose that in 2006 an inventor at a drug company synthesizes 
X, a steroid that exhibits promising pain-relieving activity. Later that 
year, the inventor files a patent application claiming X. The examiner 
rejects the claim under § 102(b) as anticipated by a third-party patent 
that issued in 1969 (primary reference) disclosing the following: 
We have discovered that treatment of cortisone under the 
conditions herein described yields steroid W in good yield. Various 
changes and modifications might be made by those skilled in the art 
without departing from the spirit of the invention. The solvent and 
specific reaction temperature employed will be primarily dependent 
on the particular reactants used therein. It is envisioned that 
modifications of the technique described herein will produce 
steroids X, Y, and Z in excellent yield.200 
 
 198. See Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to mean that [during the 
relevant time period] the reference must have been sufficiently accessible to the public 
interested in the art; dissemination and public accessibility are the keys to the legal 
determination whether a prior art reference was ‘published.’”); cf. In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (explaining that a document is publicly accessible if it “has been disseminated 
or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the 
subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and 
comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research 
or experimentation”). 
 199. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 200. This type of broad disclosure is ubiquitous in patent documents. See Seymore, Teaching 
Function, supra note 45, at 633–41 (exploring the use of “patentese” to “cast [an] invention in 
broad terms”). In this hypothetical, some language is excerpted from Certain Halogenated 2-(2-
Thiazolyl)aminofuran-5-ones, U.S. Patent No. 3,444,178 (filed June 16, 1967). 
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Although X was never made, the examiner contends that the 
disclosure is sufficiently detailed to overcome a presumption of 
nonenablement. 
In response, the applicant argues that the presumption has not 
been rebutted because steroid synthesis is so unpredictable that a 
PHOSITA cannot extrapolate the result from one experiment (the 
synthesis of W) to another (the synthesis of X) with any reasonable 
expectation of success.201 This is true, for example, because minor 
changes in structure can result in large changes in reactivity.202 
Impliedly conceding the argument, the examiner then attempts to 
show knowledge in the art by asserting a review article entitled “Fifty 
Years of Steroid Chemistry” published in 2005 (secondary reference). 
Although the review article does not report or cite a synthesis for X, 
it notes that steroids of the class encompassing W, X, Y, and Z were 
first made in the 1960s. 
The applicant responds with both a substantive and a procedural 
argument. First, the applicant contends that the review article, like 
the primary reference, is nonenabling because it lacks specific 
information about how to make X. Second, the applicant contends 
that the review article is an improper secondary reference because it 
postdates the allegedly anticipating reference by thirty-six years. 
Upon reconsideration, the examiner acquiesces and withdraws the 
§ 102(b) rejection. 
 
 201. One way to test enablement is to determine if a skilled scientist would have believed 
that the inventor’s success with the described embodiment(s) “could be extrapolated with a 
reasonable expectation of success” to other embodiments encompassed by the broad claims. In 
re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Another jurist framed the analysis in similar 
terms: 
[W]ith respect to generic claims to chemical and biological inventions, the scope of 
the claims is limited to what [the PHOSITA] could reasonably predict from the 
inventor’s disclosure. This precept recognizes that one skilled in these chemical and 
biological arts cannot always reasonably predict how different chemical compounds 
and elements might behave under varying circumstances. Thus, in so-called 
“chemical” patent law practice, the claims of a patent are limited by the scope of what 
the disclosure reasonably teaches to [the PHOSITA]. 
Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 839 (M.D. Fla. 1976), aff’d, 584 F.2d 714 
(5th Cir. 1978). Important considerations include “the type[s] of reactions, the state of the art, 
the representative nature of the examples, and the breadth of the claims.” In re Rainer, 377 F.2d 
1006, 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 202. See AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 775 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (recognizing that “the properties of these structurally similar compounds [can] vary 
significantly with minor structural changes”); In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623, 625 (C.C.P.A. 1938) 
(explaining that a patentee that discloses one member of a class of compounds may not be 
entitled to claim the entire class because certain members may react differently). 
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This new framework fulfills the fundamental purpose of the 
novelty requirement because it allows the applicant to claim an 
invention that the PHOSITA was incapable of making.203 
B. Benefits of the Proposed Framework 
1. The Framework Will Solve the Quintessential Novelty Problem.  
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the quintessential novelty 
problem is that the mere recitation of X by name or structure in a 
third-party patent can ultimately thwart a subsequent inventor’s claim 
to the compound, even though the subsequent inventor has added to 
society’s knowledge by creating it. The proposed framework would 
finally put this vestige of Von Bramer to rest, because such a third-
party patent could no longer serve as an anticipatory prior art 
reference. But if the structural recitation is accompanied with 
minimal experimental details, the burden would shift to the examiner 
to prove that a PHOSITA could have made X using then-existing 
knowledge without undue experimentation. And because the 
examiner would have a limited universe of secondary references 
available, the scales of patentability would now tip in favor of the 
inventor who actually makes X. 
2. The Framework Will More Accurately Determine the Level of 
Skill in the Art.  Aside from protecting the patent rights of subsequent 
inventors, the new framework focuses more attention on the 
PHOSITA.204 The heart of the enablement facet of the anticipation 
inquiry often turns on what the PHOSITA knows and whether the 
PHOSITA can fill in gaps in the reference.205 Because “the level of 
skill in the [relevant] art is [the] prism or lens through which [the 
factfinder] views the prior art and the claimed invention,” the 
importance of this hypothetical construct cannot be overstated.206 
 
 203. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 204. For a discussion identifying the relevant factors for constructing the PHOSITA, see 
supra note 21. For additional commentary on the PHOSITA’s identity, see generally John O. 
Tresansky, PHOSITA—The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37 (1991); Joseph P. Meara, Note, Just Who Is the Person Having 
Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002). 
 205. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
 206. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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Yet it is very easy to mischaracterize the PHOSITA, either 
because of confusion about the artisan’s identity207 or because of 
insufficient factfinding.208 Overestimating the PHOSITA’s knowledge 
and level of skill is particularly problematic in the enablement 
inquiry. This is because in both patent examination and litigation 
contexts, the “enablement determination is made retrospectively, i.e., 
by looking back to the filing date of the patent application and 
determining whether undue experimentation would have been 
required to make and use the claimed invention at that time.”209 
 
 207. The confusion arises for several reasons. First, several commentators argue that the 
PHOSITA does not remain constant from section to section of the patent statute but rather 
changes based on the purpose being served at that time. Burk & Lemley, supra note 121, at 
1189–90 (citing Tresansky, supra note 204, at 52–53). Thus, “[t]he PHOSITA for purposes of 
obviousness may not necessarily be the PHOSITA for purposes of enablement, written 
description, definiteness, or equivalence.” Id. at 1189. This means, of course, that the different 
PHOSITAs can exhibit different characteristics between sections. Id. at 1190 (explaining that 
while the authorities view the PHOSITA in the nonobviousness context as a problem solver, 
they historically viewed the PHOSITA for enablement purposes as one who “show[ed] no such 
innovative tendency, but [was] simply a user of the technology”). Second, “the knowledge of the 
PHOSITA in a particular field . . . frequently change[s] over time.” Mark A. Lemley, The 
Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 102 (2005); see also infra 
note 212. Third and relatedly, evidence shows that the PHOSITA varies by industry. BURK & 
LEMLEY, supra note 66, at 115 (comparing the biotechnology PHOSITA to the software 
PHOSITA). Fourth, unlike the PHOSITA who has a common or ordinary level of skill, patent 
law presumes that inventors and patentees have extraordinary skill. Burk & Lemley, supra note 
121, at 1189 (“Unlike the inventor, who almost by definition is presumed to be one of 
extraordinary skill, the PHOSITA standard contemplates some median or common level of 
skill.” (footnote omitted)); see also N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Because inventors generally have extraordinary 
skill, their scientific writings outside the patent are rarely even a source of knowledge about 
ordinary skill in the art.”); Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 189–90 (2007) (“Far from being one of ordinary skill, the 
inventor is by definition one of extraordinary skill, so that once the mental work has been 
completed, all that remains to be done has been characterized as the ‘work of the mere 
artisan’—not the work of an inventor.”). 
 208. For instance, Judge Rich described the PHOSITA as a “plodder” who “thinks along 
the line of conventional wisdom in the art” and does not “undertake[] to innovate, whether by 
patient, and often expensive, systematic research[,] or by extraordinary insights.” Standard Oil 
Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Until quite recently, Judge Rich’s 
view of the PHOSITA as an unimaginative and uncreative person persisted in patent law even 
as inventions have become more technologically complex. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to 
Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 
888, 891 (2004) (explaining how the Federal Circuit “all but ignored” the PHOSITA because 
the court presumed “that PHOSITA [was] an uncreative plodder, incapable of making 
inventions of his own”). The Federal Circuit recently abandoned the plodder presumption, 
however, and now strives to accurately elucidate the PHOSITA’s identity. See infra notes 215–
19 and accompanying text. 
 209. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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Retrospection raises two concerns. The first concern, as discussed in 
Part II.A.2, is the potential for hindsight bias.210 The notion that X 
could not have been that difficult for a PHOSITA to make becomes 
more problematic as the filing date becomes more distant.211 The 
second concern is that the PHOSITA’s knowledge and abilities can 
change over time, most notably between the time of filing and the 
time of the enablement analysis.212 The corollary is that “whether a 
disclosure is enabling can shift over time; as the knowledge of the 
PHOSITA shifts, an identical disclosure may shift from not being 
enabled to being enabled.”213 This has led Professor Timothy 
Holbrook to conclude that “[e]nablement, while conceptually simple, 
is legally and factually complex.”214 
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,215 the Supreme Court 
reemphasized the importance of accurately determining the 
PHOSITA’s identity and knowledge.216 In resolving whether the 
nonobviousness PHOSITA could combine the teachings of the prior 
art to arrive at the claimed invention, the Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s narrow and inflexible approach to the question.217 Now the 
 
 210. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 211. See sources cited supra note 121. 
 212. Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 41–43 (2009) (explaining that the level of skill in the art may have evolved since 
the filing date, which is important because enablement is assessed at the time of application). 
 213. Holbrook, supra note 31, at 129–30. 
 214. Id. at 129. 
 215. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 216. See id. at 420–21 (“A person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of ordinary creativity, not 
an automaton.”); see also Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the 
Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1000 (2008) (“[After KSR,] courts will 
have to pay more attention than they have in the last quarter-century to who the PHOSITA is 
and what he or she thinks.”); Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 237, 250 (2008) (recognizing that KSR banished the Federal Circuit’s “dullard” 
PHOSITA). 
 217. Before KSR, the Federal Circuit and the C.C.P.A. resolved the question with the 
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) test, which deemed a patent claim obvious if some 
motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings could be found in the prior art, the 
nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a PHOSITA. See, e.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 
1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining the TSM test); In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 
1961) (“The mere fact that it is possible to find two isolated disclosures which might be 
combined in such a way to produce a new compound does not necessarily render such 
production obvious unless the art also contains something to suggest the desirability of the 
proposed combination.”). The KSR Court held that the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the 
TSM test is inconsistent with the “expansive and flexible” approach to nonobviousness set forth 
in prior precedent. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12, 17, 
18 (1966); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850)). 
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Federal Circuit appears to devote more attention to the PHOSITA in 
both its nonobviousness218 and § 112 enablement cases.219 As a matter 
of logical consistency, it is now time to also devote more attention to 
the anticipatory-enablement PHOSITA. By requiring the examiner to 
prove with specificity what the PHOSITA knew during the relevant 
time period and limiting the universe of secondary references, the 
proposed framework does just that.220 
3. The Framework Will Reduce the Chaff in the Patent Literature.  
Patents are a form of technical literature.221 Considering that § 112 
 
 218. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301–02 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Ordinarily, [a PHOSITA] expects a concentrated or purified ingredient to 
retain the same properties it exhibited in a mixture, and for those properties to be amplified 
when the ingredient is concentrated or purified . . . . If it is known how to perform such 
isolation, doing so ‘is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common 
sense.’” (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 402–03)); Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 
F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that the obviousness analysis “is not the result of a 
rigid formula disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a case,” but requires a 
consideration of “the common sense of those skilled in the art”). 
 219. In the predictable arts, for many years the courts adopted the view that a single 
embodiment was often sufficient to enable a broad claim. See, e.g., Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. 
Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that a patent need only disclose a 
single embodiment to satisfy enablement); In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1944) 
(explaining that an inventor “is generally allowed [broad] claims, when the art permits, which 
cover more than the specific embodiment shown”). In other words, a PHOSITA in the 
predictable arts could always fill in gaps omitted from the disclosure. Seymore, supra note 46, at 
282–83. A few years before KSR, the Federal Circuit vitiated the “single embodiment” 
enablement doctrine and moved toward a more stringent “full scope” enablement standard. See 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that 
a disclosure that enabled an injector with a pressure jacket was insufficient to support a claim 
that covered injectors with and without pressure jackets); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 
1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (determining that when the claims covered a Type 1 or a Type 2 
aluminum coating, yet the patent only described a Type 2 coating, the claims were nonenabled 
because a PHOSITA could not fill in the gaps without undue experimentation); Seymore, supra 
note 46, at 284–89 (describing the emergence of “full scope” enablement as a “lever to 
invalidate patents”). Several commentators suggest that the new standard is tied to a resurgence 
of the Federal Circuit’s written-description doctrine, which has essentially blurred the line 
between it and enablement. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with 
the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–63 (2000) (contending that “neither the Federal Circuit nor the 
C.C.P.A. has ever articulated a persuasive rationale for distinguishing the written description 
requirement from the enablement requirement”); cf. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, 
Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (observing that the two disclosure requirements are 
“closely related” and “usually rise and fall together”). 
 220. See supra Part III.A. 
 221. For instance, like technical journals, patents show the state of technology, set forth 
what others have already achieved, and provide technical information about procedures that 
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compels patentees to provide an enabling disclosure, a PHOSITA 
should theoretically be able to rely on the patent document and 
existing knowledge in the art to practice the claimed subject matter 
without undue experimentation.222 This teaching function becomes 
particularly important when one considers that most information 
disclosed in a patent is never published in another medium.223 
Yet although patents are in many ways quite similar to other 
technical information sources,224 they are not often viewed as an 
important channel for information flow.225 One reason is that patents 
“seldom teach enough so that someone can actually go out and 
actually do the invention without some additional work.”226 Relatedly, 
patent documents are often indecipherable, even to those with 
 
others then need not repeat. THOMAS T. GORDON & ARTHUR S. COOKFAIR, PATENT 
FUNDAMENTALS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 51 (2d ed. 2000). 
 222. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
 223. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 554 (2009) (“Much of 
the information contained in—or that ought to be in—patents is not published elsewhere.”); 
Esteban Burrone & Guriqbal Singh Jaiya, Intellectual Property (IP) Rights and Innovation in 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 3 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/pdf/iprs_innovation.pdf (“It has been estimated that patent 
documents contain 70% of the world’s accumulated technical knowledge and that most of the 
information contained in patent documents is either never published elsewhere or is first 
disclosed through the publication of the patent application.”). 
 224. See supra note 221. It is also true that “in many ways, a scientific publication and the 
patent document share similar goals—namely to disclose something novel, to teach fellow 
artisans how to replicate the invention or discovery, and to spur further innovation in the field.” 
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 663 (footnotes omitted). 
 225. See Wesley M. Cohen, Akira Goto, Akiya Nagata, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 
R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RES. 
POL’Y 1349, 1362–64 (2002) (presenting empirical research showing that among information 
sources for diffusing research and development in the United States, patents rank third behind 
publications and informal information exchange). Several commentators have speculated as to 
why this is so. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 665 n.227. 
 226. Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2007, 2025 (2005) (quoting Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n 53 (Mar. 20, 2002) 
(statement of Daniel McCurdy), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020320trans.pdf). 
This is true, at least in part, because an inventor need not create a working embodiment or 
engage in any experimentation before obtaining the patent. See supra note 123. Rather, an 
inventor can describe an invention with fictitious, constructed examples. And if these examples 
lack sufficient detail, there is a presumption that a PHOSITA can rely on knowledge in the field 
to fill in the missing information. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. In sum, a 
disclosure that cannot teach a PHOSITA how to practice the invention has little substantive 
value. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 22 n.16 (2008) 
(“[R]esearch suggests that scientists don’t in fact gain much of their knowledge from patents, 
turning instead to other sources.”). 
SEYMORE IN FINAL.DOC 12/29/2010  5:30:42 PM 
968 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:919 
specialized knowledge.227 Rather than fulfilling the statutory mandate 
to provide a written description using “full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms,”228 many applicants draft a document laden with jargon and 
formalistic, imprecise language.229 The applicant can thereby cast the 
invention in broad terms, essentially stretching the disclosure.230 
Although applicants may engage in this activity to preserve claim 
scope,231 to set the stage for continuation practice,232 and to avoid 
 
 227. See, e.g., Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial 
Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 713–14 (1996) (observing that chemical 
patents “tend to be shrouded in chemical nomenclature,” which makes them hard to 
comprehend); Note, supra note 226, at 2022 (explaining that patents “are notoriously hard to 
interpret”). 
 228. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006). 
 229. See Note, supra note 226, at 2025 (“Although patent applicants are supposed to provide 
a ‘full, clear, [and] concise’ written description of their invention so that their peers in the 
industry can easily read and understand it, very few patents today meet that standard. Instead, 
the goals of clarity and brevity take a back seat to drafting strategies meant to ensure that 
patents are interpreted broadly by the courts.”). Notwithstanding the disclosure requirements of 
§ 112, many patentees adopt the view that the written description does not define the invention 
but rather provides examples or embodiments of the invention. Rather than use language that 
explicitly describes what the invention is, for instance, a savvy drafter would say something like, 
“In an embodiment, one aspect of the invention relates to . . . .” See George F. Wheeler, 
Creative Claim Drafting: Claim Drafting Strategies, Specification Preparation, and Prosecution 
Tactics, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 34, 43 (2003) (advising patent claim drafters to 
couch specific inventions in the broadest manner possible). 
 230. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 634–35 (noting how the disclosure can 
be stretched by “employ[ing] boilerplate patentese to help cast the invention in broad terms”). 
 231. The U.S. patent system uses a peripheral claiming regime in which claim language sets 
forth the metes and bounds of the invention, like a deed to real property. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”). Perhaps 
not surprisingly, patentees exploit the inherent indeterminacy of language to maximize claim 
scope by deliberately building ambiguity into the patent document. Clarisa Long, Information 
Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 542 & n.187 (2004); see also R. Carl Moy, 
Subjecting Rembrandt to the Rule of Law: Rule-Based Solutions for Determining the 
Patentability of Business Methods, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1047, 1082 (2002) (“[P]eripheral 
claiming imposes no inherent limit on the level of abstraction that the patentee is able to use in 
the claim.”). 
 232. A continuation application is a second application for the same invention disclosed in a 
parent (original) application that is filed before the parent application either issues as a patent 
or becomes abandoned. 35 U.S.C. § 120. It has the identical written description as the parent 
and enjoys the benefit of the parent’s earlier filing date. Id. Applicants file continuation 
applications for many reasons. For example, an applicant may decide to prosecute a parent 
application with narrow claims (which will issue relatively quickly) and then prosecute broader 
claims in the continuation application. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 161–62 (4th ed. 2006) 
(describing continuation applications, as well as the strategies and benefits associated with 
them). An applicant can use this strategy “to gain advantages over competitors by waiting to see 
what product the competitor will make, and then drafting patent claims specifically designed to 
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linguistic pitfalls233 and problems with new matter,234 they also 
occasionally do so to “muddy the waters in a defensive or nuisance 
maneuver” to thwart subsequent, deserving inventors.235 
Under the new paradigm, padding patent documents with 
unclaimed subject matter will no longer give a third-party patentee a 
strategic advantage.236 This raises hope that patentees will draft 
leaner, more technically robust documents. Thus, the new paradigm 
could help transform patents into repositories of valuable technical 
knowledge competitive with other information sources.237 
4. The Framework Will Promote Innovation and Other Goals of 
Patent Policy.  Promoting innovation is often viewed as the primary 
goal of the patent system.238 Innovation is a complex process that 
 
cover that product.” Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2004); see also EDWARD F. O’CONNOR, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND LITIGATION 116–17 (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that continuation practice 
gives patentees considerable flexibility to craft claims directed to specific products). 
 233. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 635–36 (describing language traps that 
may lead to an undesired claim construction). 
 234. Upon filing, an applicant cannot amend the disclosure to introduce new matter into the 
application. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure 
of the invention.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f) (2009) (“No amendment may introduce new matter into 
the disclosure of an application.”); see also MPEP, supra note 125, § 706.03(o) (directing 
examiners to be on alert for new matter). The new-matter prohibition of 35 U.S.C. § 132 and its 
corollary, the written-description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, “both serve to ensure that 
the patent applicant was in full possession of the claimed subject matter on the application filing 
date.” TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 
1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 235. Wainwright, supra note 34, at 221–22. When a patentee discloses more than he or she 
enables for § 112 purposes, that subject matter can nonetheless be asserted as prior art against 
subsequent inventors, at which time it will enjoy a presumption of enablement. See supra notes 
125–27 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra Part III.A. 
 237. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 656–57 (arguing that transforming 
the patent into a readable teaching document and making an actual reduction to practice the 
standard of disclosure would produce patent documents that could achieve this result). 
 238. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he 
ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public 
domain through disclosure.”); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 
(1979) (noting that one goal of patent law is “[to] promote[] disclosure of inventions to 
stimulate further innovation”). This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the “ultimate purpose” of the patent grant is to “promot[e] 
the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ by guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the 
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brings inventions into widespread, practical use by “feed[ing] on the 
known and convert[ing] it into the new.”239 In his recent book, Driving 
Innovation, Michael Gollin contends that innovation is a three-stage 
cyclical process in which individuals first engage in creative labor 
using existing knowledge. The product of that labor is then 
distributed among and adopted by society, ultimately adding to the 
pool of accessible knowledge for other creative individuals to use and 
improve on.240 Patent laws affect each stage by providing incentives to 
invent, disclose, and design around patented technology;241 by defining 
boundaries; and by modulating dissemination and the entry of 
knowledge into the accessible domain.242 
Under the current regime, X may never even enter the 
innovation cycle. When a third-party patent discloses but does not 
claim X, the patent likely does not enable X.243 Thus, the disclosure 
provides the PHOSITA and the public with no substantive technical 
information about the compound. When the Patent Office denies a 
patent to a subsequent inventor who can actually make X,244 it not 
only deprives that inventor of a potential opportunity to reap an 
economic benefit from the compound but also deprives the patent 
system of an opportunity to obtain a technically robust disclosure that 
actually enables X.245 And because the subsequent inventor will 
 
public domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8). 
 239. MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION 11 (2008). 
 240. Id. at 15–19. 
 241. F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present 
Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 61 (2003) (“The patent system in this country has 
generally been seen as offering inventors an incentive to do something they might not otherwise 
do—for example, invent, disclose, commercialize, or design around.” (citing DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEWMAN & F. SCOTT 
KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 58–90 (2d ed. 2001) (exploring diverse incentive theories of 
the patent system))); see also State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design 
around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of 
innovations to the marketplace.”). 
 242. GOLLIN, supra note 239, at 11, 18–19. 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 26–30. 
 244. A subsequent inventor can possibly obtain a new-use patent, however. For an 
exploration and criticism of new-use patents in this scenario, see discussion supra note 188. 
 245. Rejecting a claim to X will essentially foreclose the opportunity to fully exploit the 
compound. Cf. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The Problem of Gene Patents, 3 WASH. U. GLOB. 
STUD. L. REV. 701, 735 (2004) (arguing that inventions that are never exploited, and thus that 
never reach the market, are economically irrelevant). In addition, if the subsequent inventor 
abandons the patent application, the public will not gain access to the presumably enabling 
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probably not disclose X in another medium,246 the public may never 
get possession of the compound.247 
Allowing a subsequent inventor to claim X, on the other hand, 
will have the opposite effect. First, the subsequent inventor can 
exploit the compound, thereby providing a reward for the inventive 
effort and encouraging further creative activity.248 Second, the new 
framework will add to the store of knowledge for others to use. 
Assuming that the subsequent inventor files an application that 
complies with the requirements of § 112, the public will finally obtain 
an enabling (and, hopefully, technically robust) disclosure once the 
application publishes or the patent issues.249 By opening the door to 
X’s patentability, the new framework will promote innovation and 
other goals of the patent system. 
C. Criticisms 
Although the new framework has several potential benefits, it 
has implications for the patent system that extend beyond the 
question of novelty. This Section explores some potential criticisms. 
1. Extended Pendency.  One potential concern with the new 
paradigm is that it will increase the pendency of applications in the 
 
technical information disclosed in it. That the subsequent inventor will disclose the information 
in another medium is also unlikely. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
  Turning back to the availability of a new-use patent, most would agree that it would 
provide less economic or technical benefit than a (broader) patent covering the compound itself. 
See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA, supra note 188, at 351 (explaining that method-of-use 
patents are generally less valuable than the patent covering the compound itself); see also 
Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. 
ECON. 34, 52 (1995) (arguing that narrow patent protection inhibits the disclosure and 
dissemination of information useful to others). 
 246. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 247. See GOLLIN, supra note 239, at 18 (“[The cycle] stops when creative people lack access 
to information, . . . when innovations are lost, and when law and circumstances make 
innovations inaccessible.”); supra Part I.B. 
 248. Patent law “seeks to foster and reward invention” with the hope that the disclosure will 
“stimulate further innovation and . . . permit the public to practice the invention once the patent 
expires.” Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see also Paulik v. 
Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“The reason for the patent system is to 
encourage innovation and its fruits: new jobs and new industries, new consumer goods and trade 
benefits.”). But “[e]ven if no incentive is required to produce an innovation, providing a reward 
after the creative act encourages [the inventor] and others to do more creative work in the 
future.” GOLLIN, supra note 239, at 38. 
 249. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 627 (arguing that the teaching 
function should be an important goal of the patent system). 
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Patent Office. It is certainly true that requiring the examiner to prove 
that a prior art reference is enabling will impact production goals.250 
This is a valid concern because the Patent Office’s current 
compensation system emphasizes throughput,251 which means that it 
rewards examiners for certain activities but not for others.252 For 
instance, the first Office Action253 and a final allowance or rejection of 
an application each count toward the examiner’s quota. But searching 
the prior art, corresponding back and forth with the applicant, and 
issuing subsequent Office Actions—including the final one—do not.254 
An examiner thus has little incentive to bicker with an applicant over 
anticipatory enablement.255 Rather, the examiner is better served by 
forcing a concession upon the applicant and then allowing a patent to 
issue.256 
 
 250. “Production goals are the number of specific actions and decisions that patent 
examiners must make about patent applications they review during a 2-week period.” U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1102, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: 
HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 2 
(2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071102.pdf. Implicit in these goals is an 
estimate of the time it takes to review a patent application. 
 251. The amount of time the Patent Office allots for an examiner to dispose of a case 
depends on factors like seniority and the technology involved. See id. at 7. Time estimates vary. 
Compare John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for 
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314 (estimating a sixteen- to seventeen-hour average 
time allotment), with Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1500 n.19 (2001) (aggregating time estimates, which range from eight to thirty-two 
hours, depending on the technology). 
 252. See generally MPEP, supra note 125, § 1705 (describing the procedures for crediting an 
examiner’s activities on the Examiner’s Case Action Worksheet and the Biweekly Examiner 
Time and Activity Report). 
 253. An Office Action is an official communication from the Patent Office stating the 
examiner’s position on patentability and the basis for any claim rejections. See 37 
C.F.R. § 1.104(b) (2009) (describing the nature and content of the Office Action). 
 254. See MPEP, supra note 125, § 1705 (setting out which examiner actions receive a count). 
 255. Under the status quo, a savvy examiner who wants to maximize monetary and 
performance rewards should reject the application once, issue one Office Action, and then allow 
the application. See Nikolas J. Uhlir, Note, Throwing a Wrench in the System: Size-Dependent 
Properties, Inherency, and Nanotech Patent Applications, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 327, 340 n.88 (2007) 
(explaining the compensation system and the incentives it gives to examiners). 
 256. See ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY 97–98 (2001) (discussing the examiner’s 
concerns and incentives). Although allowances and final rejections both count toward an 
examiner’s production goals, several commentators argue that the incentive system favors 
allowance. See Lemley, supra note 251, at 1496 n.3 (“[E]xaminers must write up reasons for 
rejection, but not reasons for allowance, giving them more incentives to allow rather than reject 
an application.”). Thus, the skewed incentives of the current regime “make it easier and more 
desirable for examiners to grant patents rather than reject them.” Joseph Farrell & Robert P. 
Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent 
Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 
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There are at least three responses to this point. First, the Patent 
Office recently decided to review its production goals.257 This long-
awaited “completely fresh look”258 at the examination process will 
hopefully lead the Patent Office to fix its compensation system. 
Second, although negotiation is an integral facet of patent 
prosecution,259 the Patent Office’s incentive and reward structure 
should not, as a normative matter, compromise an applicant’s ability 
to obtain a patent for a claim to which he or she is rightly entitled.260 If 
the examiner rejects a claim to X, it should be because the compound 
is truly unpatentable, not because the examiner persuaded the 
applicant to acquiesce for the sake of expediency. At least in the 
novelty context, requiring the examiner to prove that an allegedly 
anticipatory reference is enabling will help fix this problem. 
Third and relatedly, eliminating the presumption of enablement 
will force examiners to scrutinize prior art more carefully.261 Many 
commentators and proponents of patent reform have indeed argued 
that a large number of patents would not issue if the examiner had 
access to, and adequate time to consider, the relevant prior art.262 So 
 
945 (2004). Savvy applicants are aware of the skewed incentives. See Lemley & Moore, supra 
note 232, at 75 (contending that “an examiner faced with a determined applicant has every 
incentive to give in and allow the patent”). 
 257. The current time estimates and quotas were established in 1976. Despite criticism over 
the past decade, Patent Office officials have not updated them to reflect increasing technical 
complexity, and those officials are insensitive to the number of pages or claims in an application. 
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 250, at 1–9 (discussing the problems 
examiners have with outdated, unrealistic production goals that do not accurately reflect the 
time needed to review applications). Finally, in response to the GAO Report, the Patent Office 
is seeking to reevaluate its production-management system. Patent Examiner Production Goals 
Study, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. (May 15, 2009), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/
comp/proc/pgs/pgshom.htm; see also Stephen Barr, Backlog, Quotas Overwhelm Patent 
Examiners, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2007, at D1 (discussing the GAO Report and comments from 
the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); sources cited supra note 4. 
 258. Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 4. 
 259. See MIELE, supra note 256, at 96–97 (describing the patent-prosecution process). 
 260. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 261. As one commentator explains, under the current system examiners have a monetary 
disincentive to engage in an extensive prior art search because “doing so means that they have 
more work to do with less pay than they would receive had they not searched for the art and 
simply issued the patent.” David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a Limitation 
on the Duty of Patent Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 205, 228 (2002). 
 262. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 
EMORY L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008) (exploring criticisms); Lemley, supra note 251, at 1500 (“[M]uch 
of the most relevant prior art isn’t easy to find—it consists of [third-party activities] that don’t 
show up in any searchable database and will not be found by examiners in a hurry.”); Michael 
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to the extent that the new framework would lead to an increased 
attentiveness to prior art, it would improve the quality of application 
review and ultimately the quality of issued patents.263 
2. Information Dissemination.  Another concern is that the new 
paradigm will create a disincentive for third-party patentees to 
disclose any more than is necessary to satisfy the disclosure 
requirements of § 112.264 Most information disclosed in patents is 
never published elsewhere.265 If an inventor withholds knowledge, it 
will likely be lost.266 Furthermore, Judge Pauline Newman believes 
that any paradigm that might lead a patentee to limit the content of 
the disclosure frustrates innovation and technological advancement.267 
But the nature and quality of the information under 
consideration is important. The new framework does not seek to 
curtail the disclosure of substantive technical information. To the 
contrary, written descriptions should include more information 
because it makes the patent document a more robust source of 
technical information.268 And to the extent that this additional 
information describes work actually performed, it allows the patent 
document to more closely resemble the experimental section of a 
 
Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 196 
(2007) (“A high-quality prior art search is difficult because of resource and time limitations.”). 
One reform goal, stated in the Introduction to the Patent Reform Act of 2007 as proposed in the 
Senate, was “to improve patent quality and the patent application process.” S. REP. No. 110-259, 
pt. 1, at 5 (2008). 
 263. Improving patent examination and patent quality are now priorities in the Patent 
Office. See supra note 4. 
 264. This is also a potential criticism of the disclosure-dedication rule. See supra notes 124, 
126 and accompanying text; see also Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 668–69 
(responding to the criticism). 
 265. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 266. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 666 (discussing situations in which 
“the patent system is the sole medium of disclosure” and arguing that a heightened disclosure 
framework is needed when substantive technical information may otherwise be lost in 
unreadable patent documents). 
 267. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1064–72 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (explaining that the disclosure-
dedication rule imposes legal obstacles to the disclosure of scientific information and that those 
obstacles will deter innovation). 
 268. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 652–57 (describing how, by requiring 
working examples, written descriptions in patents could eventually provide as much useful 
technical knowledge as experimental sections in scientific journals). 
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technical journal.269 When this happens, the patent document can 
achieve the goals it shares with scientific publications—“namely to 
disclose something novel, to teach fellow artisans how to replicate the 
invention or discovery, and to spur further innovation in the field.”270 
Therefore, it  
may contribute significantly to bridging the divide between patent 
law and the experimental sciences. Including working examples, 
combined with some discussion of what is already known, serves a 
teaching role because they both provide context and allow the 
PHOSITA to more precisely (and more quickly) replicate the 
invention or discovery.271 
In this scenario, more disclosure makes patents better vehicles for 
disseminating technical information.272 
On the other hand, adding chaff to a patent document does not 
promote the document’s disclosure function.273 The new paradigm 
seeks to curtail inclusion of this material not merely because it makes 
patent documents thicker, but because its presence has several 
downsides. First, particularly in unpredictable fields, this disclosed-
but-unclaimed subject matter is often unhelpful to the PHOSITA or 
follow-on researchers because it lacks technical substance.274 And 
second, it can create roadblocks for other inventors who can actually 
enable the disclosed-but-unclaimed subject matter.275 Removing the 
incentive to include chaff will lead patentees to draft technically 
robust documents that can disseminate information better than those 
produced under the current regime.276 
 
 269. Id. at 656 & n.182 (explaining how the written description could resemble scientific 
publications’ sections on experimental data, which “disclose[] working examples and other 
experimental details”); see also supra note 221. 
 270. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 45, at 663 (footnotes omitted). 
 271. Id. at 664. 
 272. It currently appears that patents are not a dominant channel of information flow. See 
Lemley, supra note 226, at 22 n.16 (“[R]esearch suggests that scientists don’t in fact gain much 
of their knowledge from patents, turning instead to other sources.”); sources cited supra note 
225. This is unfortunate because most of the information disclosed in patents is not disclosed in 
another medium. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.3. 
 274. Unclaimed subject matter is not subject to the disclosure requirements of § 112. See 
supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Wainwright, supra note 34, at 221–22 (explaining how “nuisance prior art” can 
discourage applicants to the point of abandoning their patent applications); supra note 235 and 
accompanying text. 
 276. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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CONCLUSION 
The novelty requirement seeks to ensure that a patent will not 
issue if the public already possesses the invention. Although current 
novelty doctrine is sufficient to gauge possession for inventions in 
applied technologies, it fails for those in unpredictable fields like 
chemistry. It thus at times produces paradoxical outcomes at odds 
with basic principles of patent law. By shifting presumptions and 
burdens of proof, the proposed patent examination framework will 
resolve these problems and improve the quality of both issued patents 
and the patent literature. And because patent applications in nascent 
technologies continue to rise, the proposed framework will spark 
more interest in exploring how patent law and policy should evolve to 
accommodate these technologies. 
